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# Near East/North Africa Report

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## NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

INTERVIEW WITH MADRID PLO CHIEF

Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 14 Oct 79 pp 19-22

[Interview with Munzir Dajjani, PLO delegate in Madrid, by Soledad Alameda; date and place not given]

[Text] The Palestinians who were children in 1948 are 35 or 40 now. Since that time, many of them have known nothing but wars and refugee camps. Many of them have been and are guerrillas. Many have died. The youngest adults were already born in exile or as refugees. Munzir Dajjani was one of that era's children, but for many years his fighting name was Abu el Ezz. He now holds the post of head of the PLO delegation in Madrid. He speaks to us today in these pages, and what he says is similar to an X-ray view of himself, his people and his country.

[Question] The concept of fatherland is less passionate, less present in European countries, for example, than in countries in which liberation struggles are going on, Nicaragua, to cite a recent case. How do Palestinians, how do you yourself, feel about your fatherland?

[Answer] European, African or Asian citizens who live in their own countries devote their attention to work and family and to pursuing facets of life and feelings that are common to free men. When they are asked about their desires or hopes, they will naturally say that they want more money, a better job, greater family harmony, a brilliant future for their children. But when a Palestinian is asked that question, he replies without hesitation that what he wants is to return to his homeland, because it has been 30 years since he lost it and because he knows perfectly well what he is, that he is an exile. I think that this lack, this loss of identity definitely makes him sad and prevents him from devoting himself to love, to happiness and to the normal work that most men do. I would



say that Palestinians are very much in love with their land precisely because they are separated from it, and as happens with all passionate love affairs, it extends to everything that their land produces, even poisonous plants. Palestine determines everything in my life, even my attachments and social relationships. To me, to us, Palestine is simply the past, present and future.

[Question] At what age did you realize that you were an exile, that your land had been occupied?

[Answer] I was 4 years old when England, the United States and the Zionist movement brought in hundreds of thousands of European and Arab Jews to Palestine, despite the opposition of my people to that policy. My father and my uncle, a pharmacist and surgeon, respectively, had a hospital in Haifa, the best hospital in the Near East. The entire family had to move to Gaza, where my mother had a small house and a garden. It was clear that the Palestinian people had to pay the region's price for the Second World War, and they paid it with their land, their sovereignty and their economy. In 1948 the Palestinian people were like strangers in their own land, subjected to all sorts of terrorism and massacres, expelled and living in refugee camps. I was going to school in Gaza in 1955. It was the last day of the school year, and it was on that day that I had my first encounter with death. The Israelis bombed the city, and all of us students ran out. A close friend of mine and I each went to our houses. The next day, this friend, whose name was Jaled, didn't make it to school; he had been killed by an explosion. I did not know what death was; I was quite young. But I had a strong feeling that it was something like permanent absence. I also found out that the bombs were Israel's present to our school commencement celebration.

[Question] This is your first recollection of death. What was your first encounter with a weapon?

[Answer] In 1956, after a bombing run that also scattered white sheets of paper calling for the surrender of the Palestinian people. My brothers and I had taken refuge underneath a tree, where we hid for the entire day. When my mother allowed us to come out, we headed home, and I saw an Egyptian soldier throw a rifle under a tree. I picked it up. It was a British rifle. I hid it on the roof of my house. A long time passed before I told my father anything about it. It was like a secret that I wasn't sharing with anyone. I often went up to take a look at it and clean it. Soon thereafter I became a member of the Association of Young Christians of Gaza. At that time I was very fond of listening to older people. They spoke about Palestine, about how long we had been living under the occupation, about Arab unity, about Nasser. They sat down and kept on talking.

Meanwhile, my rifle was still in hiding, and I didn't even really know why I was keeping it. Perhaps I was waiting for my elders to say something in this regard, but they said nothing.

[Question] How did you make contact with Al Fatah?

[Answer] During a vacation at my sister's house. My brother-in-law, who was an engineer at some oil wells near the Red Sea, had a small, thin, dirty magazine. For the first time in my life I saw in print that Palestine had been betrayed. It said who the Zionists were and recounted the treason of the British and of many Arab regimes. The magazine was called OUR PALESTINE, and it was put out by Al Fatah. A year passed (I really don't know why) before I spoke about it with my brother-in-law. Shortly thereafter, I entered university to study engineering, 350 kilometers from Cairo. Around that time I began talking more or less every day with my companions about this, about Al Fatah. But neither I nor the others really knew what the organization was, although most of us agreed with what they were saying. We decided to run in the university elections to establish relations with Al Fatah later on. We were elected and we contacted the organization. We were put in charge of organizing the movement in the university. I have to say that from that moment on, as far as I was concerned, the university was only a cover for my work in the organization. No one discovered us, despite the secret services, and in 1966, before leaving on vacation, they entrusted me with buying weapons and getting ready several men who knew the road from Palestine to Gaza. I got a revolver, a machine gun and two grenades and I made an agreement with two companions to entrust them with missions later on.

[Question] How important were university students at the outset of the PLO?

[Answer] University students have played an extremely important role in the organization. This is absolutely certain. Even Arafat and all of our comrades in the leadership started their work as students. You can obviously do more when you're better prepared, no doubt because consciousness-raising is easier for a person who is prepared.

[Question] When did you meet Arafat?

[Answer] In 1964, at an underground meeting in Cairo. He was with comrade Faruk Kacdumi, who is in charge of the organization's foreign affairs today. I met him again in 1968, coming back from a mission in Jordan. On that occasion he sent me to southern Palestine, and when I protested that I was used to working in crowded cities (because I was being sent to the countryside), he told me in reply that the invader was everywhere and that we had to go in search

of him. He went on to say that unfortunately the enemy understood only the language of force and that we would be victorious because we were in the right.

[Question] Would the PLO have been the same without Arafat?

[Answer] The organization's leadership is collective, and the process of succession is too. Arafat is unquestionably the leading figure, but if he died or fell, it would not mean the death of the revolution. His replacement has already been prepared, in fact, because, as I said, our work is collective. Of the nine comrades who began the revolution, five have fallen (at the hands of the Zionist forces or Arab regimes), and the revolution has moved forward.

[Question] To what degree have relations between the Palestinians and the other Arab countries deteriorated because of the revolution that you are fighting, and what consequences could this have if the war ends some day?

[Answer] The Palestinian people, who are spread throughout many Arab countries, unquestionably identify with the struggle, and they back or oppose the regimes in these countries to the extent that they support the Palestinian struggle. But we cannot speak of deteriorating relations between Palestinians and other Arabs, just certain Arab regimes at a given moment. Relations between the Palestinian people and the Arab peoples are excellent. I could cite for you so many cases that confirm what I am saying...For example, I can tell you that the first time that I went into Jordan, I reached Amman with a mission. There, I went to look for my uncle, whom I didn't know and who was a cabinet minister. He gave me refuge in his house for 3 days, offered me an arsenal of weapons that he kept hidden and took me in his official car to the meeting with my comrades. But, above all, this man sincerely cried when I told him of our struggle, what we were after, why we were struggling. And this is a very little compared with the mothers who are willing to sacrifice their sons, with entire families who risk their lives by hiding Fedayeen.

[Question] How did your mother react when you joined the armed struggle?

[Answer] When the Six Day War (1967) broke out, we received instructions from the organization to join the struggle in full force. We left from Cairo airport for Damascus. There were 22 of us, and we were armed. My mother came to say good-bye to me; she didn't ask me anything. The only thing that she said was: "What's going to happen with your studies?" I told her that I would complete my

studies when we had a land and a house to hang my shingle. Soon thereafter we traveled to the training camp that Al Fatah had near Damascus.

[Question] You were a political commissar at this camp. What did you do?

[Answer] We gave talks about the revolution, about why we were fighting, against whom, how to do it. In addition, every afternoon, groups of us headed for occupied land on operations through the Jordan and the Golan Heights. We took special suitcases containing weapons, explosives and books to be handed out among our people. Other groups headed for recently occupied lands to pick up arms that the Arab armies might have left behind while retreating.

[Question] Haven't you at times wanted to live a normal life, like a person not involved in a war?

[Answer] I believe that a person like me, like Palestinians in general, without a fatherland, without an identity, is a warped person and that we will not develop, in the normal sense of the word, until we return to our fatherland. This is the case both individually and as a group, as a community, as a people. But I think that this is difficult to understand for a person who has not experienced what we have. You could even say that this is a defect of ours, but it is not a defect that stems from Palestinians themselves, from their makeup as a people. It is a painful and artificial element that has been attached to, superimposed on the personality of Palestinians. But I think that this is a defect that will be corrected by returning to our fatherland.

[Question] And how does this defect show up, especially in a man who has been a guerrilla, like you? What do you lack? What do you miss?

[Answer] I would summarize it in one word: my land.

[Question] How has the struggle affected relations between people who love each other?

[Answer] A normal couple can determine the kind of relationship they want to live with, in accordance with their own feelings and circumstances. They can marry, live together, begin and end relationships, have or not have children. A Palestinian can never think about a relationship that way. Before all else, he thinks about whether the relationship will fit in with the struggle, whether his love will enable him to continue in the struggle or not, whether it contradicts the struggle.

[Question] And how do you feel about the idea of death?

[Answer] I take it for granted that we live in an abnormal situation, and therefore, it is hard for me to imagine how I would feel about death if I were a normal, regular man. Death is something quite different to me and my family. To begin with, as head of the family, I am not afraid of what would happen to them if I passed away. My family is so bad off that my death could never worsen their situation. Of course, no one totally loses his fear of death. But I think that from our viewpoint there are expensive and inexpensive deaths, some that are worthwhile and others that are not. When a person dies for something sacred, for a principle or the fatherland, his death is unquestionably worthwhile. We have a scale of values. I have values. It is not the same thing to die suddenly as to die struggling. Nor is it the same to die struggling against the enemy inside our homeland as outside it. To die while struggling and to die in Palestine comes first on the scale as far as I am concerned.

[Question] What problems are these feelings that you call abnormal, this warping, going to cause for your people in adapting?

[Answer] There will be no problem. It is like a person who has a tumor and, suddenly, he is operated on, it is removed, and he perks up and regains his health. I think that when we return to our homeland we are going to be happier and enjoy everything that we cannot now.

[Question] You realize that there could be repercussions...

[Answer] I am convinced that on a psychological level everything has repercussions and also that we will have to resolve these "warpings." I also know that it is not going to be done overnight. The Palestinian people will need some time to regain psychological normality, to have "normal" reactions. But I am sure that it is going to be very easy because the joy of living in our own land will help us.

[Question] There are two factors that are perhaps causing the most trouble: religious fanaticism and violence...

[Answer] Obviously. Some of our people have become exasperated with false promises and feel great mistrust, especially towards the great powers. Under these circumstances, some people have backed out and turned to God for want of anything or anybody else, in search of confidence. At the opposite extreme, others have turned to violence. These two issues will unquestionably have to be dealt with when the Palestinian people return to their land. There will

be religious fanaticism, but not among a majority, and there will be violence to take care of. These are reactions triggered by the situation in which people are living.

[Question] Nationalism, religious fanaticism and violence usually bring on fascism. This could happen with the Palestinians, as some say it has with Israel's Jews.

[Answer] There is a difference. Spanish, French or American Jews live immersed in a society and carry on a normal life within it. When the Zionist movement took them to Palestine to become part of Israel, it did so at the cost of uprooting them from their customs, the society in which they lived, their past. And in Israel they came face to face with a mixture of people from many different societies and with different outlooks and customs. This created complexes in many of them that have led to the Israeli Government's current attitude. The exact opposite happened with the Palestinian people, who were homogeneous, with the same customs and circumstances, and in whom all of the warpings and abnormalities that we are commenting on were caused precisely (don't doubt it) by their dispersion into many different countries. Thus, Palestinians will be normal again when they return to their land, when they regain their place as a group. In contrast, I think that the citizens of Israel will regain their normality only when they return to the society from which they came. This is a distinction that we ought to be very clear about. Don't forget that they speak more than 100 languages in Israel.

[Question] And do you think that Palestinians who were born in exile and return, let's say, at age 50 are also going to adapt right away? Won't their case be more difficult?

[Answer] A Palestinian child born in a refugee camp and returning to his land, as you say, at age 50, has grown up, from the very moment of his birth, immersed in the question of Palestine. As soon as he opens his eyes after birth, his father, following an ancient custom, puts water, or sometimes earth, from Palestine on his eyelids. And when he is 4 or 5 years old, his father takes him by the hand, takes him outside the army tent where they live in the refugee camp and says to him: "You see that land a few kilometers from here? Well that's where we had a better life and were happier." This means that or explains why a Palestinian will be happy when he returns to his land, no matter what age he is, because he has finally gotten to where he dreamed of all his life.

[Question] Do you hate an enemy when you struggle against him?

[Answer] You lose your hate. I lost it one day when several comrades fell during a mission. I couldn't explain it to you; I

think that only a person who has experienced it can grasp it. I felt as if those dead brothers were growing inside me, and I also felt that I no longer hated the enemy. Perhaps that's why later on, during a mission on which we were supposed to destroy a factory that produced heavy water for a nuclear powerplant, we didn't care about running risks to prevent the bomb that we had set from exploding when the factory was full of civilians at work. We preferred to bury ourselves up to our noses in sand for 10 hours, while the Israelis looked for us, rather than kill civilians and have more time to get away.

[Question] It must be easier to kill when you feel hate, mustn't it?

[Answer] There comes a time when you cannot forget that the enemy has a wife and children and that he is no doubt an innocent fellow who was brought in under the illusion that the land was empty, uninhabited.

[Question] But tell me, is it more difficult to continue killing when your hate is gone?

[Answer] A person at times does things very much against his will, very much so, things with which he does not agree psychologically.

[Question] And this creates a conflict in a person's head, in yours, for example, doesn't it?

[Answer] Well yes, there are conflicts. A person's homeland at times forces him to do things that are at variance with his way of being or his feelings. This has happened to me. In mid-1969 I felt completely drained and was sent to London for treatment. After all of the necessary examinations, the doctor told me that my illness was due to an internal conflict caused by the will to do certain things and the body's ability to do them, to hold up. According to what the doctor told me, this is such a typical and clear-cut illness that it only occurs in wars. The internal conflict between what I had to do and what my conscience dictated could have had very serious consequences if it had not been treated in time. The treatment consisted of getting away from everything, from the struggle; I remained a year in drydock.

[Question] Does the struggle make you harder, more understanding?

[Answer] I think that a person who struggles for a just cause becomes more human, more understanding. When the struggle is unjust, a person becomes inhuman, harder, and I think that the

conflict must be greater. Just look at the American soldier in Vietnam. He was not convinced about his own struggle, and the upshot was a great deal of crime and violence when he returned to his own society and country. And let's not talk about internal crises. We do not know of a single similar case of crime and violence in a Palestinian soldier.

[Question] The Jews in Israel are having problems because of their low birth rate. Exactly the opposite is the case with your people; you are reproducing incessantly. Is this a "weapon," so to speak, or is it simply a longstanding custom?

[Answer] In 1948 there were 150,000 Palestinians in Palestine. Today, the statistics of the Israeli Government itself show that there are 600,000 of us. The fact is that Palestinians in occupied land had their reasons to have more children: they were convinced that they were being subjected to a war of extermination and that they needed a lot of children to survive. Golda Meir said in connection with their situation that it was a time bomb against the Jews, and when she said that the Palestinians didn't exist, their reaction was to bring more children into the world.

[Question] And don't the motives of survival coincide with the lack of birth control methods? Because you would also think that in a situation like the one that the Palestinian people are living in, in refugee camps, etc, it would be better not to bring children into the world. Perhaps that would be how a very educated person would react.

[Answer] No one wants to see his children suffer from hunger and calamities, without a chance to get an education. Palestinians would not have been so prolific, I assure you, if there were not reasons that I would call war-related.

[Question] When a person has fought for his entire life, like you, what do you feel life or the struggle has taken away from you?

[Answer] I think that we have not passed through the decisive stages of adolescence and youth and everything that it is normal to know and experience during those years. I have spoken about this with a number of comrades, and we mentioned, for example, that we did not have sexual experiences during our youth, as would be normal. But when you're involved in the struggle, the fact is that you don't have the time to think about this, and you don't even try to. Some psychiatrists recommend that parents keep their teenage children occupied so that they don't think about all these sex-related things. Well, our parents didn't have to worry about this; it was taken care of for them.



[Question] You have also missed strolling in the moonlight, reading, going to the movies...Do you regret this?

[Answer] I miss not having been able to continue my studies as far as I would have liked, and, sure, other things, like reading. But now, at age 35 and at this point, I have come to the conclusion that what I did, what we did, was the best thing that we could have, and I also think that the books that we read or the struggle that we pursued enriched our experience. I have not acquired the conventional culture, but I unquestionably have a different sort of culture, one that I have acquired over many years of guerrilla warfare.

[Question] For some time now you Palestinians have been hijacking fewer planes and launching fewer indiscriminate attacks. Your struggle is becoming more political than combative.

[Answer] I have two things to say about this. First, the PLO has never been in favor of these overseas operations or plane hijackings. But there is another parallel concept. Previously, the voice of the Palestinians was not heard in the world, and a number of Palestinian groups, fortunately in the minority, wanted this voice heard in the world and utilized the means that you have mentioned to accomplish this. Erroneous means, obviously. Nowadays, thanks to this struggle and the political struggle, carried on in parallel, the world listens to us and with increasing attention. At last we no longer have to resort to other than a strictly political struggle.

[Question] Everyone feels fear some time, even a hardened fighter like you. When did you feel most afraid?

[Answer] In 1971. We were in northern Jordan, surrounded by the Jordanian Army. It was the last stronghold, the final escalation of the developments of September 1970. We had reports that the army was going to launch a general attack on our last bases. It was a combination of personal fear and fear for the revolution.

[Question] As far as you are concerned, what is the relationship between revolution and personal future?

[Answer] Without any doubt many of us could, with our degrees, lead or make normal lives, but that doesn't interest us. To me, to talk about the future is always to talk about the national and political future of all of us. My future and the future of the revolution are one and the same thing, something inseparably joined. Perhaps this is not easy to understand, because the relationship between a man and his people, his land only comes out when the land is in danger, when he does not possess it.

Notes, Memoirs and Memories

During Yassir Arafat's recent visit to Spain, Marcelino Oreja asked him in one of their talks whether he was planning to write his memoirs. "I could, I might, as soon as I have the time," the PLO leader replied. He went on to say: "We Palestinians have a very good memory; we meticulously file every political and military situation. But if our memory fails us, if we fall during the struggle, I recommend to my people that they carry a small diary to jot down daily events and their reflections on them." Arafat then showed Oreja a small notebook with tiny handwritten notes.

Munzir Dajjani is the head of the PLO's diplomatic delegation in Madrid. He also keeps a small notebook and has a memory that is long in time and extensive in events, some of them tragic. During his adolescence and youth he even tried to change the course of some of these events. Travel, the desert, death and exile have been the constants throughout his life. He came into contact with the PLO while at university. Shortly thereafter, he was the organization's university representative. Later on, for several years he also held the post of political commissar at an Al Fatah camp near Lebanon, with incursions into occupied territory. He thus became a Fedayee, an outstanding Fedayee who held posts of the highest military responsibility in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon.

He has now held a diplomatic post in Madrid for the last 4 years. "I might stay here and I might also be sent back to the organization's military apparatus. We Palestinians are willing to come and go wherever we're needed. The organization trains us to work in all of the facets of the revolution. You could call it a veritable transfer system." Munzir Dajjani has four children. The eldest's name is Ezz, after his father's name in the underground and which his comrades still know him by: Abu el Ezz. Arafat's, for example, is Abu-Ammar. Munzir Dajjani was born in Jerusalem 35 years ago. With his sad eyes that seem to look inward, weary and somewhat timeless eyes, he still says today that the revolution and his personal fate are indivisible, inseparable, so much so that he could not imagine what his life would be like if the revolution were to fail, because it would make no sense then. But the international stand on the Palestinian issue has changed, and therefore, the notion of a Palestinian homeland has begun to gain momentum.



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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SALIM LAWZI LOOKS AT IRAN AS DEFENDER OF ISLAM

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 2 Nov 79 pp 28-29

[Article by Salim Lawzi: "Can Iran Take the Place of the Ottoman State in Filling the Role of Protector of the Sanctuary of Islam Throughout the World?"]

[Text] The 500 years of Ottoman rule over the Islamic countries, including the Arab countries, are justified in the eyes of history by the fact that the Ottomans were the protectors of Islam in the face of the invasion of the Crusaders. Indeed, the Turks were the most heroic of the Islamic elements in the war against the European attackers against Jerusalem. And because they filled the role of protector of the sanctuary of Islam against Islam's enemies, their state remained well-loved by Moslems, and even Arabs, until the last days of Ottoman rule. By no means did the majority of Arabs support the outbreak against Turkey during World War I. After mentioning Husayn ibn 'Ali's revolution against the Turks, some Arab colonists would follow this reference to the fighting sherif with stinging criticism. In Egypt, for example, the revolution against the Ottoman state is considered to have been based on an erroneous position which caused harm to the Arabs and served the influence of the Western powers which inherited the Ottoman rule.

One who reads the statements of the de facto officials in the Iranian revolution--namely, the leaders of the leaders and the ministers of the ministers--notes that Iran is now seeking to fill the role of protector of Islam and is taking its place as successor to the Ottoman state. The struggle for the liberation of Jerusalem made the Turks masters in the past, and this same struggle is appropriate to make the Persians masters today--at least in the Gulf.

But can Iran rightfully assume the capacity of protector of the sanctuary of Islam in this region?

The difference is that the Gulf is now governed by families which protected before they ruled. The deputyship or trusteeship which is in their hands charges them with combating the threats emanating from the countries

surrounding the entities or societies--or Arabism, as it is now called. The Sabah, Khalifa, Thani, and Nuhayan families, among others, became the leaders in their societies because they wore the sword of protection and represented the Arab purity of origin going back to Bedouinism. If the ancestors of these rulers could be asked now which description or name they would prefer--that of ruler or that of protector--they would probably choose the latter. While it is true that they protected the Gulf against other Arab's on occasion, they also protected it from non-Arabs. Thus Kuwaiti history, for example, records the near reverence accorded to the battle of al-Jahrah, which was led by the Sabah family.

However, the quintessence of the struggle waged by the Gulf families was the defense of the Arabism of the Gulf. For the Sabah family is still in Kuwait, and the Khalifa family is still in Bahrain. On the other hand, the shaykhs of al-Muhammarah from the Khaz'al family and the shaykhs of Basra from the al-Naqib family are pure Arabs who have been overtaken by time. The Khaz'al family was destroyed by the force of the Iranian victory, and the al-Naqib family disappeared as a natural development. A long time has passed since the days of ancient glories when popular poets in Basra said of Talib al-Naqib: "One-third is for God and two-thirds is for Talib, and God's third is claimed by Talib." The current fear for Basra, the Shatt-al-Arab, the islands, and the entire Gulf is now centered on Iran, in contrast to the days when people feared for Iran's safety from the shaykhs of Basra, the cavalry of the Shatt-al-Arab, and the attacks of the Qasims.

It is not easy for Iran to fill the role of protector of the sanctuary of Islam, whether in the Gulf or elsewhere, even though Egypt's absence from the Arab arena has encouraged all other powers to assume larger roles. Khomeyni's standing grew in importance after the role of the rector of al-Azhar diminished. For Khomeyni is an exceptional man, and there are no exceptional men in Egypt. After Israel succeeded in taking possession of parts of all the Arab states surrounding it, the might of all Arabs weakened, not just that of the Egyptians. Nevertheless, the Arabs continue to hold the privileged position among Moslems, because in the final analysis Islam is Arab, and the Arab countries are the richest of the Islamic countries, have been most often in the mainstream of common universal history, and are the most important of the Islamic countries strategically, both in military and nonmilitary terms.

It is not permissible for a non-Arab power to use the Arabs' reversal to diminish their role, as Iran is now doing. For if Khomeyni loves Jerusalem and Palestine, then he as an imam is in keeping with the teachings of his religion, and this act does not entail any benevolence or reward except the reward of God in heaven.

The shah fell because he went against Arab national feelings, and out-bidding is the counterpart of opposition in terms of throwing salt in the wounds and offending sensibilities. The Palestinians have the first right among Arabs and Moslems to reap the fruits of a revolution which, beyond the slightest doubt, they had a part in making. They would be neglectful of themselves and their cause if they failed to interest freely and completely with the Islamic revolution in Iran--especially since the Palestinian revolution itself also developed in an atmosphere of Islamic revolutionary ideology, and the success in Iran is a success of the one ideology, not just a success of military and political cooperation.

However, despite the Palestinians' right to be proud of the Iranian revolution, they still have a duty to remain realistic and nationalistic in their dealings with the Arabs, and in particular with the Gulf states. The people of the Gulf, on the other hand, must understand balance, for every side retains its full right. The Iranians, the Palestinians, the people of the Gulf, and all other Arabs and Moslems have their rights.

The rulers of the Gulf are highly skilled in maintaining balances, and they are unlikely to make a mistake in this regard. If they avoid such a mistake, and if the Palestinians and in particular the Iranians do likewise, then the balance will continue to serve all sides. But if this does not happen, the cost will be high. The struggle will not be ended easily, once it has begun, and the revolution which is a hope today could turn into a curse tomorrow.

If Israel wanted to create a conflict which would rid them of the Arabs, the best place to do it would be the Gulf. From an objective standpoint, the conflict in the Gulf is an Israeli conflict, even though Israel itself is remote from it. Thus the failure of a three-way balance among the people of the Gulf, the Palestinians, and the Iranians would be Israel's most significant victory. In fact, it would be nothing short of being the most significant conflict on the Israeli-Arab border.

An avenue to the failure of this balance exists at the present time in the Iranian ambition to fill the role of protector of the sanctuary in the Islamic region!

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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SALIM LAWZI VIEWS PALESTINIAN INFLUENCE IN ARAB OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES

London AL-HAWADITH in Arabic 9 Nov 79 pp 20-21

[Article by Salim Lawzi: "Conference of Understanding and Communication Between Gulf Rulers and Khomeynites, Arranged by the PLO and Supervised by Abu 'Ammar!"]

[Text] If Qadhdhafi and Abu 'Ammar have a disagreement, which one of them will win the loyalty of the Palestinians who comprise 30 percent of the military strike vanguard of the Libyan Army? Does the importance of the Palestinian revolution lie in its growing military strength, estimated at 250,000 fighting men, or in its potential for aggravation and penetration in Arab and Islamic countries--especially those countries of the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf that contain oilfields?

Is the cautious position of the Gulf rulers regarding the Iranian revolution merely the result of fear for their oil?

Most people I met during my recent visit to Kuwait and Bahrain asked me: What is the nature of the alliance between Khomeyni and Arafat? Is it a strategic or a tactical alliance? How long can it continue? Is it true that Khomeyni is trying to use his alliance with the Palestinians to confront the demands of Arabistan?

These and other questions contain suppressed concern that the Palestinian-Iranian alliance will be reflected in difficulties, problems, and currents. For there is a fear in the minds of Gulf rulers that the Palestinian revolution's rapprochement with the new Iranian regime is taking place at the cost of aggravating the historical problems which continue to exist between the Arabs and the Persians--problems concerning the identity of the area, the nature of the geographical boundaries, and the quality of relations. These relations must be good and strong, without deceit by either side, and without either side having strong supremacy, whether this supremacy is alloyed with Islamic slogans or not. Therefore, my answers to the questions posed to me did not generally satisfy the questioners. I was content to reply that whether the Palestinian-Iranian alliance is strategic or tactical, the two sides benefit from it, and it will continue to exist as long as the benefit remains mutual!

This summarization was intentional. For I know that the Gulf rulers' fear of Iranian aims predates the arrival of the oil era and is based on specific human and geographical factors that can be termed nationalistic, territorial or sectarian. But they are absolutely not material factors based solely on oil.

Moreover, it would not have been easy for me to give a lecture on the nature of the alliance between Khomeyni and Arafat when the feeling in the Gulf is that any approach which the Palestinian revolution makes toward the Iranian regime without taking the view of the Gulf residents into consideration is an indictment of their joint national and Arab bond with the Palestinians. One Gulf leader told me frankly: The Palestinian revolution is entitled to have all other revolutions and revolutionaries in the world rally around it--and especially all Moslem revolutionaries--but with one condition: that this does not happen at the expense of the Arabism of any other Arab region. For when they reach out to the Iranians, their hearts must continue to beat for the Arabism of the Gulf as well. In Iran, there are extremist elements within the Iranian revolution which proceed from a position of hostility to the Arabism of the Gulf. These elements form a nucleus of deep misunderstanding between the Iranians and the people of the Gulf. The tragedy is that the Palestinians find themselves swept up, with or without their knowledge, in a deepening of this misunderstanding!

During the storm stirred up by Imam Khomeyni's son-in-law, Hujjah-al-Islam 'Abbas al-Mahri, in Kuwait and by Ayatollah Sadiq Ruhani in Bahrain, a press conference was held by the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait, Dr Ali Shams Ardكاني, to soothe Gulf apprehensions about Iranian ambitions. The ambassador related what the Iranian revolution had given to its sister movement, the Palestinian revolution: "Iran lost \$750 million worth of oil which Israel did not pay for because we dared to cut off relations, although in practical terms we are not in a state of war with Israel. We cut off our relations with Egypt after the signing of the Camp David agreements, without concern for the debts Egypt owes us, which amounts to \$2 billion. We threatened to cease our dealings with Turkey unless it cut off relations with Israel, because the imam believes that any Islamic country which deals with Israel commits a sin against its religion."

The ambassador also said: "Moreover, the new Iranian constitution includes a provision which makes the Arabic language compulsory at all stages of education, from elementary school to university. This is the first time anywhere in the world that a state has included in its constitution a stipulation compelling its citizens to learn a language other than the official language of the country."

Dr Shams revealed that a large contingent of responsible officials in the Iranian revolution participated in the Palestinian resistance struggle. Dr Mostafa Shamran, the current minister of defense, is the commander of the Iranian group that fought in the Palestinians' ranks for 5 years. Their headquarters was located near the city of Sur (South Lebanon).



I went to see one official in the Gulf and found him with the statement of the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait in front of him. He had underlined certain passages in red to indicate their importance. When the ambassador says that the Government of Iran halted its shipment of oil supplies to the Philippines because of the Philippine Government's oppression of the Islamic minority, and that it warned Turkey to sever its relations with Israel, this confirms the remarks made by Dr Sa'dun Hammadi in an interview in New York: "There are Iranian attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Iraq. The group acts on the basis that the Iranian revolution is a world revolution ready for export!"

Offering me a photocopy of the interview with the Iranian ambassador to Kuwait, the Gulf official asked:

--Have you read it?

--Yes.

--Do his words inspire confidence?

I tried to use all my diplomacy in order to reply tactfully.

--I do not believe that these words were directed at the rulers. The Iranian revolution, and in particular its representatives in the Gulf, most of whom are from Imam Khomeyni's group, are trying to speak to the people in a way that will win their hearts. The statements about the bonds of Islam, the liberation of Jerusalem, the triumph of the Palestinian cause, and the severing of relations with the Zionist enemy--"because the imam believes that any Islamic country which deals with Israel commits a sin against its religion"--are words which delight Arab ears and awaken responses, dreams, anxieties, and stirrings in the depths of Arab souls!

He asked irritably:

--How will all of that be interpreted? If Iran believes that it has the capability to export difficulties to us, then are we also capable of exporting difficulties to them?

--I don't believe it would be wise for you to allow things to go that far. I met with Abu 'Ammar in Beirut before coming to the Gulf, and he told me that the Khomeyniites are their allies and they are in a position to contain the fires with ease if they are ignited. So why don't you call on the Palestinians for help?

At this point the official's nervousness increased, and he said:

--We do not need the Palestinians or anyone else. We are capable of confronting this by ourselves.

In an effort to calm him down, I said:

--Frankly, I don't see the reason for this sensitivity, for in the final analysis the Palestinians are your friends. When it comes to a choice between Arab welfare and Iranian welfare, it is well known which one they would choose.

I concluded:

--Isn't that better than turning to the Syrians for help and thus arousing the sensitivity of our brother Iraqis?

I do not recall his reply exactly. Officials in Kuwait and Bahrain label Syrian mediation "commendable efforts." But just by posing the question I realized that Gulf rulers prefer to deal with the Iranian revolution on a sectarian basis rather than on a revolutionary basis. In the first case there is a potential for exploiting sectarian differences, while in the second case there is limited room in which to maneuver. For although there is a sectarian relationship between al-Assad and Khomeyni, the relationship between Khomeyni and Arafat begins with Jerusalem and the position on Israel, and extends to hostility toward the Americans and military cooperation.

I asked Yasir Arafat when I met him on the eve of my trip to the Gulf:

--Have you read the pamphlets issued by the mass movement in Arabistan? They say that you are the ones who train Khomeyni's militias known as "al-Jarik," or the Revolutionary Guard.

Abu 'Ammar replied:

--This is not a charge. We really do train the Revolutionary Guard!

I also asked Abu 'Ammar about a story I had read in a diplomatic report concerning an incident which took place during the 1 September celebrations in Libya. The story says that a noted Arab personality was beside Abu 'Ammar when Soviet T-74 tanks--which are among the most advanced tanks in the world and are called by some military men "armored fortresses"--passed by, followed by squadrons of MIG-23 aircraft and missile-carrying vehicles of every kind and description. The quality of modern weaponry which appeared in the celebration was fantastic and impressive. The Arab personality whispered in Abu 'Ammar's ear: "Is it plausible that Libya has military experts capable of using all this weaponry?" Abu 'Ammar smiled and said: "Between 50 and 60 percent of the men driving the tanks, planes, and missile carriers are Palestinians!"

Abu 'Ammar corrected the information in the diplomatic report: "I did not say 50 percent. I said about 30 percent!"

Naturally, those who read this story posed the question: If Qadhdhafi has a disagreement with Abu 'Ammar, who will win the loyalty of the Palestinians who make up this high percentage of the Libyan Army? In exactly the same way, Gulf rulers pose the question of the organic alliance between Khomeyni and Abu 'Ammar, which has reached the point that the Palestinians have taken over the training of Khomeyni's militias, known as the "Revolutionary Guard." The information available on this military force, which the Revolutionary Council under Ayatollah Husein Montazeri has decided to increase to 1 million men, indicates that Khomeyni's intention is to transform these militiamen into a force equal in strength to the Iranian Army. The theory on which the formation of the Revolutionary Guard was based was that the guard will prevent the Iranian Army from assuming internal security responsibilities. For if the Islamic revolution finds itself compelled to seek help from a professional army--an army whose loyalty is above all to its military principles, aside from the fact that most of its leaders were schooled in concepts which differ from those of the Islamic revolution led by Khomeyni--and if it uses this army to confront disturbances such as those which are cropping up in Kurdish and Arab regions, then the army's hold will inevitably become stronger and its influence will increase, as is always the case in such instances. If this occurs, the army could easily be induced to seize power, making the Islamic revolution a cover for militarism, rather than remain a suppressive tool in its hands.

Of course, the process of forming the Revolutionary Guard is still just beginning. However, this does not keep the battles which the guards are fighting with Kurdish revolutionaries and those demanding independence in Arabistan from accelerating the process of formation or from working to fuse the guards in unity and to make their needs readily perceived. It was recently decided to furnish the Revolutionary Guard with armored cars and APC's in addition to setting up its own organizations for domestic and foreign surveillance. Palestinian experts who oversee the Revolutionary Guard's training in fighting street battles say that the importance of this Islamic army--if this label is permissible--lies in the fact that it believes in its ideology and is devoted to its spiritual leadership. Moreover, this army does not have fixed levels of pay, but rather each volunteer receives what he needs for himself and his family, regardless of whether he is an ordinary individual or has a high military rank. They call this pay a "stipend!"

One informed Arab asserts that one of the reasons why the Americans and Israelis have moved quickly in seeking to remove Egypt from the Arab arena is Egypt's acceptance in recent years of ample numbers of Palestinian students in high military academies, including both the naval academy and the air colleges. Now, all of a sudden, the Palestinian revolution is making up for its losses in Egypt with important gains in Libya and Iran, to the extent that the Israelis are now saying that if a Palestinian state comes into being, it will have a military force of 250,000 fighting men.

Of course, it is to Israel's advantage to exaggerate the size of the Palestinian revolution's military force in order to try to show the dangers to peace that the existence of a Palestinian state would create. The objective assessment, however, is that the importance of the Palestinian revolution does not lie in its growing military strength so much as in its capacity for aggravation and penetration in the Arab and Islamic countries, especially those countries of the Arab Peninsula and the Gulf that contain oilfields.

When Fulbright was chairman of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, he had a Jewish aide who was constantly saying: "It is impossible to bring about a secure solution for the Gulf and the Arab Peninsula unless the Middle East problem is solved. And the Middle East problem cannot be solved without a solution of the Palestinian problem!" Thus for more than 10 years--that is, ever since Britain announced its decision to withdraw its military forces from areas east of the Suez--maintenance of the security of the Gulf has occupied an important place in the thinking of policymakers in the United States. Although American strategists used to advocate reliance on its two main allies in the Gulf, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Dr Henry Kissinger planned for the shah's regime to be the sole rock upon which the United States would build its defense system in the Gulf. This was done for various reasons, one of which was the widespread notion among American military leaders and politicians that the shah's regime was stronger, more stable, and more powerful than any other regime in the Gulf area--a notion which has since been proven false. Another reason was the secret and open cooperation, if not to say alliance, which existed between the shah's regime and the state of Israel. Now, after the Iranian rock has been smashed and the system for the defense of the Gulf and its oil is exposed and even in danger of collapse, what country will form the new rock?

The inability of the United States to control events in the area, and the Carter administration's inability to oppose the Soviet Union's penetration of and increasing activity in the Gulf states, have brought about a wholesale reshuffling of the cards, a reversal of alliances, and the development of axes. Saudi Arabia has turned its back on Egypt and moved toward Baghdad, and an alliance has arisen between Khomeyni and Arafat in place of the alliance that once existed between the shah and Israel. Even more serious than all this, however, is the whetting of the appetites of all those who demand change to become active in the area and ride the wave of the Iranian revolution--a movement which is allied with the Palestinian revolution, considered by itself to be the fuel which ignites the feelings of the Arab masses from the Atlantic to the Gulf.

What can the Gulf states, or even America itself, do to counter the effects of the Iranian upheaval? Talk of special military forces ready to carry out military operations patterned after the Israeli action in Uganda known as the "Entebbe operation" is idle conversation, by the admission of American military leaders themselves. For the era of direct military intervention has ended, and its only importance is as a bargaining chip in the game of dividing up interests and influence. The United States has

realized that the Achilles heel of security in the Gulf is its connection with the Arab-Israeli struggle. However, the United States continues to avoid facing this fact for reasons related to Jewish influence, and is making an effort to continue posing hypothetical dangers which are still in the invisible realm, such as the repercussions which will ensue from the coming of power of Shiite clergymen in Iran, the dangers of the alliance between the Islamic revolution and the Palestinian revolution, and the instability which could bring about a rise of military regimes in place of conservative regimes!

One Gulf ruler asked me about the truth of a story ascribed to Yasir Arafat-- that he is using his alliance with Khomeyni to catch the rulers of the Gulf in the same way that hunters use a falcon to catch bustards when they go hunting in the desert. I said:

--Even if Arafat didn't say that, it undoubtedly reflects a possibility that has been raised. The mistake is that Gulf rulers are not making use of this alliance, but rather are fearing it or attempting to encircle it!

I added:

--I suggested to our Palestinian brothers that they organize a conference under the powerful slogan of former Prime Minister Sa'ib Salam, "Understanding and Communication," which would bring Gulf leaders and Khomeynites together and would be supervised by Abu 'Ammar himself. At this conference, all the cards would be laid on the table in order to create the least possible amount of misunderstanding!

He said: But we have not heard about this idea.

I said: It is still in the talking stage. And it's up to Abu 'Ammar to give the word!

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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

ISLAMIC PRECEDENTS FOR DIPLOMATIC IMMUNITY STUDIED

Paris LE MONDE in French 25-26 Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Maxime Rodinson, Director of Studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes: "The Immunity of Diplomats in Islam and the Prophet's Example"]

[Text] The states of the Moslem world in the classical era, as in any other, were necessarily obliged to negotiate with foreign powers. No negotiations without rules to safeguard the negotiators, that has been recognized since prehistory.<sup>1</sup>

The vast corpus of ideal norms called Moslem law barely goes into this problem. It talks of the rights and obligations of believers or of the community of believers. But there were rules derived from pre-Islamic Arab customs and confirmed by Islam according to which a believer could give real or potential non-Moslem enemies safe-conduct, protection ("aman"). Diplomatic envoys automatically enjoyed "aman."<sup>2</sup>

Like any Moslem rule, it was justified by the Prophet's example. Here is the interpretation of a "hadith," "a prophetic interpretation," a normative account found with slight variations in several collections of traditions.

In it, it is said that the "false prophet" Mosaylima, a rival of Mohammad in the central part of Arabia, then called Yemama (not to be confused with Yemen), had sent a letter to Mohammad to suggest to him that they divide the Arab territories between them. Under the concepts of Islam the heading was blasphemous: "From Mosaylima, the envoy of God, to Mohammad, the envoy of God." Two messengers delivered this letter.

"A sheik of the Ashja' (the author of the oldest traditional biography of the Prophet, Ibn Is'haq who died about 150 A.H. [after the hegira], 767 A.D.) tolde me that according to Salama Ibn Mas'oud Al-Ashja'i who heard it from his father No'aym (an esteemed companion of the Prophet--note by Maxime Rodinson): "I heard the envoy of God tell those two emissaries: "And you, what do you yourselves think about it?" They replied: "We say the same as he does." He (Mohammad) then asserted: "By God, if it were not for the

fact that one does not slay envoys, I would have beheaded both of you..." This happened at the end of 10 A.H., that is, at the beginning of 632 A.D.<sup>3</sup>

"I Do Not Hold Envoys"

Among others, this account is found in the collection of traditions ("sunan") compiled by Darimi (died in 255 A.H., 869 A.D.)<sup>4</sup> and in that of Abou Daoud As-Sijistani (died in 275 A.H., 889 A.D.).

These two traditionalists turn this example of the Prophet into a norm which the very pious and extremely venerated companion of the Prophet, Abdallah Ibn Mas'oud, applied in an exemplary fashion at the time he was administrator of the city of Koufa in Iraq some 10 years after the Prophet's death and the repression of the revolt (which came soon after) against the new Moslem government of the Banou Hanifa tribe. This tribe in fact followed the "false prophet" Mosaylima who was a member of it. It was reported to Abdallah Ibn Mas'oud that some of the Banou Hanifa tribe were extolling Mosaylima as God's envoy in a place of worship ("masjid," literally a place for prostrating oneself, a "mosque"). He had the guilty ones brought before him, exhorted them to repent, then pardoned them with the exception of one 'Obada Ibn Al-Harih, known as Ibn Nowaha, whom he had beheaded. To those who were amazed at this different treatment, Ibn Mas'oud explained that this Ibn Nowaha was one of Mosaylima's two messengers mentioned above who had refused to disavow the "false prophet." Mohammad had not had them executed since at that time they were protected by their status as ambassadors. Now things were no longer the same and Ibn Nowaha deserved to die because he was a "renegade."<sup>6</sup>

The learned and pious contemporary Moslem writer, Mohammad Hamidullah, in his "Life of the Prophet,"<sup>7</sup> cites two other cases. During the Prophet's first campaign against Mecca, a Moslem negotiator was held by the people of Mecca and a rumor spread that he had been assassinated. During this time Mohammad in his encampment was succeeding in concluding a truce with negotiators from Mecca. He retained them until his own ambassador had been returned to him. In another case, an ambassador of Mecca to the Prophet was touched by Moslem grace. He wanted to remain with his new coreligionists. But Mohammad refused to allow him to stay. "I do not violate pacts," he said, "and I do not hold envoys. If you continue to think as you now do, you may come back (to us)." The man in question, a Copt, it would seem, returned to Mecca. Then, no longer having the status of ambassador, he did come back to the Prophet at Medina and embraced Islam.

It is seen that for the Islamic religion also the immunity of diplomatic missions is a norm regarded as sacred.

FOOTNOTES

1. See Ragnar Numelin, "Les Origines de la Diplomatie," Paris, Flammarion, 1945.
2. See the article "Aman" by J. Schacht in "L'Encyclopedie de l'Islam," second edition, Volume 1, Paris (G. P. Maisonneuve) and Leiden (Brill), 1960, p 441 ff.
3. Ibn Is' haq, "Vie de l'Envoye de Dieu (Sirat rasoul Allah, published by Wustenfled, p 965; published by M. M. Abd Al-Hamid, Cairo, 1365/1937, Volume 4, p 272).
4. Book 18, Chapter 60, "On the Prohibition to Kill Envoys," Damascus, 1349/1920/1931, 2, p 235.
5. "Sunan," Book 15, Chapter 154, "Concerning Envoys (Messengers, Ambassadors)," published in Cairo by A. M. Al-Tazi, undated, 1, p 434.
6. Cf Baladhori, "Kitab fotouh Al-boldan," published by De Goeje, 1866, p 87, published in Cairo, 1350/1932, p 97, translated by Ph. K. Hitti, "The Origins of the Islamic State," New York, 1916, p 133.
7. "Le Prophete de l'Islam," Paris, Vrin, 1959, 2 volumes, Vol 2, p 649.

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ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

DRAFT OF ISLAMIC CONSTITUTION PREPARED

Cairo AL-DA'WAH in Arabic Oct 79 pp 22-24 and 41

[Article by Dr Mustafa Kamal Wasfi, vice-president of the [Egyptian] council of state]

[Text] If there has been any reason for not applying the Islamic religious law, as some say, it has been the shortage of Islamic scholars who are capable of preparing the Islamic constitution. This, then, is the draft of an Islamic constitution which is just about complete. What is needed after that? This Islamic constitution insures that it is possible to establish God's law immediately if intentions are good.

The Draft of the Islamic Constitution

In 1977, the conference of Islamic religious scholars, which took place in Cairo, issued a resolution that al-Azhar University should prepare the draft of an Islamic constitution to be consulted by any government that wants its constitution to be Islamic.

A committee, called the Higher Committee for the Draft of the Islamic Constitution, was formed at Al-Azhar, and there were some subcommittees under it. I had the honor of being appointed to this Higher Committee, but circumstances prevented me from attending its meetings.

When this committee was finished with the preparation of the draft, the late lamented imam Shaykh 'Abd-al-Halim Mahmud, shaykh of al-Azhar, had the kindness to send the committee's draft to me so that I might express my observations in the form of a draft. I did so, and submitted it to the subcommittee, which resolved to submit my draft to the conference as a scholarly treatise because the appointed time for conducting the conference has approached and there was not time enough to review the committee's draft.

The convocation of the conference was postponed sine die because of the state of affairs at that time, and then I found no objection to submitting my draft to Islamic public opinion, praying to God for guidance and success.

The draft consists of an introduction and 78 articles, followed by an explanatory discourse.

The Text of the Islamic Constitution

Chapter One

The Islamic World

Article 1. The Moslems are one nation.

Article 2. The state may unite with another Islamic state in a form which is consistent with the interests of Islam, and the state will act toward bringing about economic integration among Islamic states.

Article 3. To defend and support Islamic minorities and to act toward their liberation is a duty enjoined on all Moslems.

The Form of the State

Article 4. The state of...is an Islamic state. The supreme authority in it is God, whom we extol and to whom we pray, and He is the source of sovereignty. Islamic law is its supreme jurisprudence, and its supervisor is an imam who will exercise authority in the land. He will be assisted by the consultative body and will have jurisdiction over the policy of Islamic law.

Chapter Two

The Basis of the Islamic Society

Article 5. Belief in God almighty, unity in accordance with the Islamic creed, and solidarity among the Moslems and between the people and the authority is the basis of the society and the way of life in the state.

Seeing that the nation adheres to the Islamic belief is an Islamic duth which will be performed by the individuals and by the state by all means, and the Moslems are earnestly desirous of it.

Article 6. The Islamic law is the fundamental source of legislation. Islam is the religion of the state. The Arabic language is the official language in the state. The hegira date will be used in correspondence.

Article 7. The Moslems will perform those duties which are enjoined on them in the sacred writings and will carry out their public duties of enjoining those things which are lawful and prohibiting those things which are unlawful, instituting the Islamic religious law, keeping harm from the people, and upholding the lawful public interests and the public expenditure. The state will guarantee that individuals may do so, oblige them to do so when they are remiss, and do it (for them) when they are unable to do so.

Article 8. The public governance is concerned with the interest of the community, protecting religion, individuals, posterity, intellect, and property.

Article 9. Since there is no appropriate specification in the sacred texts or in the Sunnah and there is no norm, [the following] will be observed in all public and private actions, instruments, executions, and planning: preserving the necessities, then that requirements, then refinements in matters of religion, then the individual, then posterity, then the intellect, and then property.

Article 10. The quest for knowledge is a religious duty, and instruction is the duty of the state and the religious scholars. Religious inculcation is a basic curriculum in all stages of instruction.

### Chapter Three

#### Rights and Liberties

Article 11. Rights and liberties are social functions whose exercise is carried on in accordance with the Islamic religious law. The service of legitimate interests is observed in them before all else.

The exercise of rights and liberties will be done within the limits of Islamic religious law, and every guardian is responsible for his flock.

Article 12. The covenant of protection of the Moslems is one, and the least of them will work toward it, representing the community of the Moslems in whatever public freedom he undertakes to exercise in accordance with the provisions of the Islamic religious law.

He will institute the claim for reckoning in defense of the Islamic public welfare.

Article 12. Protection of self, honor, and property is a right of every Moslem and of everyone who is legitimately present in the territory of the state, and is considered a basis for the rights of the individual and Islamic legal judgments.

Article 14. Non-Moslems as well as Moslems will observe the provisions of Islamic religious law.

Article 15. The expression of opinion, so far as it is consistent with Islamic religious law, is a duty which the state will enjoin and toward which it will set all necessary means in motion.

There will be a commitment to the opinion of the majority in whatever is in conflict with Islamic religious law.

Article 16. The state will guarantee to all of the individuals all of the freedoms that the Islamic religious law permits, and it is not permissible to infringe on them, curtail them, or regulate them in contravention of Islamic religious law.

Anyone who is treated unjustly may seek redress in accordance with the provisions of Islamic religious law.

Article 17. Every aggression on personal liberty or the liberty of the personal life of the citizens and other rights, such as the rights and liberties which Islamic religious law guarantees, is a crime the criminal or civil action arising from which will not be dropped on account of limitation, and the state will guarantee just restitution to anyone against whom the aggression occurs.

Article 18. The state will guarantee freedom of possession and property rights and their inviolability, and public confiscation by any means whatever is not permissible. Private confiscation will not take place except by judicial ruling. Territory of countries which have been taken by force will be the private property of the state, which may distribute it to individuals for them to exploit by heritable tenure. The territory of a country which was taken peacefully will be property of its owners in fee simple.

Article 19. Ostentation, and likewise all that is contrary to the Islamic commands, prohibitions, and proprieties are forbidden. Islamic public sentiment should be guarded by all means from debasement.

#### Chapter Four

##### The Islamic Economy

Article 20. The Islamic economy is based on the Islamic religious law so as to insure legitimate interests. Whatever economic laws are established to be sound may be considered to be among those things which are lawful, and resource may be had to modern economic means within the limits of Islamic religious law.

Article 21. Freedom of trade, industry, and agriculture are guaranteed within the limits of Islamic religious law.

Article 22. Transactions involving the giving or taking of interest are prohibited. This means all interest in which any dealing is done.

Article 23. The state will concern itself with promoting the economy in accordance with Islamic religious law.

Article 24. Anyone who is in need may obtain that which will satisfy his need by all legitimate means.

Article 25. Considerations of solidarity and the realization of legitimate interests will be heeded in the economic efforts of the state and of individuals.

#### The Nation

Article 26. The nation consists of the religious scholars and the generality of the Moslems. The people and the authorities in it will be two complementary elements which will assist each other mutually in acting on the sovereignty of the Islamic religious law.

Article 27. The body of religious scholars is the religious scholars of the nation according to the dominant sects in the territory of the state.

Article 28. It is the duty of every Moslem, whether he is one of the body of religious scholars or of the generality of the Moslem community, to be a member of the mosque of his quarter or village, praying there, performing as much as he can of the five religious duties of Islam, and concerning himself with the affairs of that mosque to the extent that he will not fail to attend it except when excused from doing so. The principals will be appointed with the consent and approval of the congregation.

Article 29. It is not permissible to conduct the Friday prayer in a mosque except by official permit from the appropriate quarter in the largest and foremost mosque in the city or metropolis. The local administrative chief in the city or metropolis must perform the office of the imamate and deliver the sermon. The sermon will be addressed to the current problems and will be discussed after prayer.

Article 30. The principals in the city or metropolis will be appointed with the consent and approval of the members of the Friday mosque.

Article 31. The mosques will have a legal entity and a special inviolability, and will be represented in their contracts, in the custody of their property, and in statements made in their name fore judges and other quarters by whomever the administrators choose.

Article 32. The principals in each mosque will organize the affairs of the quarter, village, city, or metropolis, collect the necessary funds for doing so, establish the legitimate public interests, bring about conciliations among the people with the counsel of the official authorities, and represent the people of the quarter, village, city, or metropolis in all of their public affairs. The principals of the mosque will supervise the waqfs and expenditures and the collection and distribution of alms in the district and the administration of the necessary local services for the city or metropolis.

Article 33. The principals of the mosque will pay the duties of homage to the imam on behalf of those whom they represent, and [engage in]

consultation if the imam and the local chief asks for it. They will also have the duty of establishing Islamic religious law, public instruction in religion, Islamic missionary activity and exhortation, and upholding morality and condemning immorality.

Article 34. The generality of the Moslems will undertake to perform the duties of giving support and advice to the imam, of public expenditure, of befriending the poor and weak, of upholding morality and condemning immorality, and of performing all of the duties of capability and the public interests. Furthermore, each of them will have the duty of paying homage to the imam on his own behalf.

Article 35. The general plebiscite on lawsuits will be conducted through the showing of hands. The matter will be brought before the mosques after a previous announcement in the manner which the law determines, and every Moslem will express his opinion on the subject of the plebiscite or be content with the vote of the administrators on it.

Article 36. The principles of Islam and the religious observances are community social duties which may not be set aside.

Article 37. Religious heresies may not be formed within the territory of the state.

The imam will be informed of any heresy, and it is his duty to adopt all means to conciliate, to discover the errors which led to its formation, and to correct its errors. Those errors will be eradicated as soon as they appear.

No one will be permitted to exercise an opinion or perform an act which violates the Islamic creed [which prevails] in the country.

Article 38. It is forbidden to form political parties with a positivistic policy.

#### Chapter Five

##### The Imam

Article 39. The state will have an imam who must be obeyed, even though one should disagree with him in opinion.

Article 40. In any matter which has been determined to be in violation of the Islamic religious law, no abedience will be rendered to any creature, even the imam himself, in disobedience to the Creator.

Article 41. The tenure of the office of the imamate will last throughout the lifetime of the imam except in case of separation for a reason which is legally permissible.

Article 42. The same qualifications which are stipulated in a judge are stipulated in a candidate for the imamate.

The nomination for the office of the imamate is made from among those whom the supervisory council nominates, those who nominate themselves, or those whom the imam nominates, provided that they are not from among his heirs.

A standing list of candidates for the imamate will be prepared after it has been ascertained that they have fulfilled the conditions required for the office. This list will be entrusted to the higher constitutional court, and, on the termination of the tenure of the imam, his successor will be chosen from it.

Article 43. The [new] imam will be chosen within 2 weeks from among the candidates by a pledge of fealty by the principals on their own behalf and that of those whom they represent and then by a pledge of fealty by the generality of the Moslems, each on his own behalf, when the pledge of fealty [by the principals] has resulted in the general consent for his assumption of the imamate. The law prescribes the method and rules for nomination and pledging fealty in accordance with the provisions of Islamic law.

Article 44. No one will be called to account for expressing disagreement with the pledge of fealty before it is made.

Article 45. The imam will be subject to the judges and will have the right to appear [before them] by proxy.

Article 46. The imam will enjoy all of the rights that [any other] citizen enjoys and will be under the same obligations as [any other] citizen. The financial regulations which the law defines will be in effect with regard to him.

Article 47. The imam will be considered a delegate from the community of Moslems in all that is considered legitimate policy for the country, and he will delegate some of his functions to the ministers, governors, subgovernors, and judges. The law sets forth the regulations which pertain to his doing so.

The imam will be responsible for leading the army to the jihad, safeguarding the seaports, and concluding major compromise treaties. The imam will deliver the Friday sermon, lead the Friday prayer, and preside over every assembly at which he is present.

## Chapter Six

### The Judge

Article 48. The judge has the general authority in disputes which arise out of commerce, compensations, and everything that pertains to ownership of property, usufruct, marriages, family ties, and crimes, whether between merchants and others or between the public authority and individuals.

Article 49. The people are equal before the judge. No person or group may be treated with preference in special courts and no special courts may be created or any litigant be deprived of his conventional judges.

Article 50. Rulings will be issued and executed in the name of God the Merciful and Benevolent, and the judge in his court will be subject to no law but Islamic religious law.

Article 51. The state will guarantee the independence of the court, and any infringement on its independence is a crime.

Article 52. The maximum penalties under Islamic law will be applied for the crimes of fornication, false accusation, theft, looting, drinking alcoholic beverages, and apostasy.

Article 53. A higher constitutional court will be created which, in addition to what is specified in this constitution or the civil laws, will concern itself with deciding to what extent the civil laws and ordinances are consistent with the Islamic religious law and the provisions of this constitution.

The civil law will define its other competences.

Article 54. The bureau of complaints will concern itself with judging cases of assault and battery, whether on the part of the public authority or of individuals, and, in these cases, it will have full authority to impose appropriate penalties, to restore the previously existing situation, and to exact compensation. The bureau will also concern itself with the accounting and compensation of the ministers, governors, subgovernors, and agents. Its decisions and rulings will go into effect immediately on their issuance. Its organization will be equipped with the means of this execution, and it will have the right to make use of all means of proof. It will judge whatever complaints are brought before it as soon as possible.

## Chapter Seven

### Consultation, Legislation, and Supervision

Article 55. Whatever learned and legally skilled persons the imam selects will engage in deliberations on debatable questions. The ministers,



governors, and subgovernors may be among those who engage in these deliberations. The imam is not obliged to follow what the persons who engage in these deliberations recommend.

Article 56. A body of senior religious scholars, called the legislative body, will undertake to enact laws, in accordance with the principles of individual judgment in legal matters. The constitutional court will select them, on the basis of the nomination of the principal scholastic bodies in the land, in the manner which the law prescribes. The laws and legislations which the legislative body enacts will be effective immediately on their issuance by that body.

The by-laws of the body will define the procedures of the issuance of the law and in what it should familiarize itself with the opinions of the appropriate learned and technical quarters and consultants.

The gate of independent judgment in accordance with Islamic religious law is open to the legislative body and may not be closed.

Article 57. A council called the supervisory council, which will be chosen from among those who pay homage to the imam, will undertake to supervise his actions and those of the public authority. This council will consist of one member from each city or metropolis, to be selected by the people of the principal mosque in it.

The constitutional court will base its selection of them on whatever change occurs amongst them. Its meeting will be in the city.

The by-laws of the council will determine the times for the court to convene, how it is to be called together, how it is to be closed, and its inviolability. It will be entirely independent of the imam and the public authority, and they may not intervene in any of its affairs.

There may be no overlapping among this council, the deliberative body, and the public offices.

The imam and the supervisory council will obtain the opinion of the legislative body in affairs of Islamic religious law; if they do not do so, his decision will be invalid.

He will also obtain the opinion of the quarters concerned in scientific and technical questions.

Article 58. The supervisory council will concern itself with the establishment of the general policy of the state, the general plan of social growth, the general budget of the state, and everything that leads to the commitment of the public revenue, all in conformity with Islamic religious law. The by-laws of the council will regulate the procedures which should be followed in this connection and the veto of these decisions by the imam.

Article 59. The members of the Islamic legislative body and the supervisory council will exercise the supervision of the compensation and allowances which the law prescribes.

Article 60. No financial charges or duties may be imposed unless the sacred writings or the Sunnay approves, and within its limits, or unless the sects agree on them unanimously. When the supervisory council has expressed its opinion of the appropriateness of these charges or duties, they will be imposed by a law which the Islamic legislative body shall issue. It is the business of the imam to impose them when such events as catastrophes, calamities, and famines occur.

Article 61. The law will set forth the basic principles for the collection of taxes and the disbursement of the revenues therefrom.

Article 62. The draft of the budget will be submitted to the supervisory council on the dates and in the manner which the law specifies.

A law for the budget will be issued and will be in effect for the duration of the fiscal year.

Article 63. The final accounting of the budget will be submitted to the supervisory council within not more than 1 year from the date of the end of the fiscal year.

Furthermore, the annual report of the office of accounts, together with its comments, will be submitted to the supervisory council. The council will pass the report on to the bureau of complaints to verify whatever accusations are contained in it and to render a judgment concerning them.

Article 64. The imam, the ministers, the governors, and the sub-governors will be responsible to the supervisory council, and each of the members of the supervisory council will have the right to address interrogations to the ministers, governors, and subgovernors.

Article 65. If the supervisory council decides to withdraw confidence from the prime minister, another cabinet member, a governor, or a subgovernor, he will be obliged to leave his post.

The prime minister will submit his resignation to the imam if his responsibility to the supervisory council is established.

#### Chapter Eight

##### The Government

Article 66. The government will be considered empowered in its actions by the imam. Its members will be considered members of his council. The government will not take recourse to the method of direct administration except by dint of necessity.

The government will consist of the imam and the cabinet. The prime minister, deputies for him, and deputies for the [rest of the] cabinet members may be appointed. Furthermore, the administrators of the regions, the governors, and the subgovernors will be considered [members] of his government, and they will all be considered [members] of the council of the imam.

The imam will supervise the actions of the government.

Article 67. It will be stipulated of anyone who is appointed minister or deputy minister that he be (nationality mentioned) an adult Moslem... Hijri year, of full competence.

Article 68. A minister will be considered authorized by the imam in the affairs of the ministry. He will be responsible for outlining the policy of the ministry within the general limits of the state and will undertake to execute it. The [responsibility of] the minister may not be for execution only.

Article 69. The minister, during the tenure of his post, may not pursue an independent profession or a commercial, financial, or industrial activity, or buy, rent, lease, sell, or claim any property of the state.

Article 70. Any minister who has been indicted will cease his activity til a decision has been reached in his case. The termination of his tenure will not prevent the institution or continuation of action against him. The trial of the prime minister, the cabinet, and their deputies will be conducted before the competent courts, and these courts will expound the law and the procedures and guarantees of the trial without infringing on the competence of the bureau of complaints.

Article 71. The territory of the state will be divided by law into regions, and the cities and metropolises will be designated. The imam will appoint a governor over each of the regions into which the country is divided and a subgovernor over each of the cities or internal metropolises in each region. An agent may be appointed over a group of villages or districts belonging to the metropolis or city, and each of these agents will concern himself with carrying out the orders of the Islamic law policy which are not left to the individuals within the limits of his jurisdiction, and will supervise the individuals and compele them to look after the interests of the Islamic law.

The governor will be considered a deputy of the imam in all of his actions and competences.

Article 72. The governor will inform the imam of the conditions of the region at least once each month, and the subgovernor will inform the amir of them once each month. They will both refer urgent matters to

the imam as soon as they occur. The imam may abrogate any actions of the governor which are contrary to the Islamic religious law or which he considers unsuitable. The governor may also do so with regard to the subgovernor. The governor may also do so with regard to the subgovernor. The governor and the subgovernor will act immediately and in complete conformity with the Islamic religious law til an order and a ruling countermanding their actions are issued.

Article 73. The powers of the governors may vary according to the distance from the capital and the variety of the people of the region and their particular circumstances.

The law will designate the principal powers in each region for the governors and subgovernors and the instruments of local government. Each region will have a council for supervision and a body for legislation, and the governor or subgovernor may select a local consultative body to assist him.

The supervisory council in the region will refer to the imam and the state supervisory council whatever violations the governors and subgovernors may commit as they occur.

#### Chapter Nine

##### General and Transitional Regulations

Article 74. The city of....[two words unintelligible; perhaps a line of text is missing] from the date of its execution, and it is not permissible to return in criminal questions and financial obligations.

Article 75. The laws will be published in the official newspaper and two of the newspapers of general circulation within 2 weeks of the date of their issuance, and will become effective after 1 month from the day after their date of publication unless some other date of effect is appointed for them.

Article 76. The imam, the supervisory council, the body of religious scholars, and the legislation will request the amendment of one or more of the articles of this constitution in accordance with the conditions which the by-laws provide for the supervisory council.

Article 77. All of the rules which the laws and regulations had established before the issuance of this constitution will remain valid and in effect unless they are repealed or amended in accordance with the principles and procedures which have been established in this constitution.

Article 78. This constitution will be in effect from the date of the announcement of the approval of it in the plebiscite.

CSO: 4802

EGYPT

U.S. SUPPORTS EGYPTIAN MILITARY STRATEGY

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 31 Oct 79 pp 9, 10

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Analysis of New Trends in the Egyptian Military Strategy"]

[Text] A few weeks ago red lights flashed at the intelligence service after a trifling report appeared in one of the intelligence agencies. The report described how commando troops stormed a police station in Cairo in order to free the wife of the troop's commander. She had been placed under arrest. In addition to this, there are rumors of unrest in the Egyptian Army and the discharge of many officers. While in Egypt I suggested that the tension between men in the commando unit and members of the State Security Division (equivalent to our intelligence service), which is responsible to the Interior Department, is not confined to this solitary incident. Neither are the army dismissals rare occurrences.

The incident with the commandos had a vague beginning, but it developed into something quite threatening. It began when a member of the State Security Division stopped a car being driven by a woman who happened to be the wife of the commando officer. At the time, the security officer had no knowledge of this. He made advances toward her but she replied with a stinging insult. In revenge he arrested her on a vagrancy charge. When her husband learned of this he and some of his fellow officers went to rescue her. They threatened to storm the police station if the woman was not released. According to the report, there was some violence. What is truly important, but not publicized, is the fact that the commando troops planned to stage a demonstration with vehicles and tanks before the presidential palace as a protest to the lack of regard for the army. The matter reached the ears of the army leaders and thanks to explanations and persuasion the entire idea was abandoned.

Had this occurred in any other Arab state it would be fair to observe that this is how a revolution develops. Actually, Egypt is different. However, there are observers who say that in spite of the sensitivity over a gratuitous insult to the wife of a senior officer this is proof of a sentiment felt in various Egyptian army circles that the status of the army has been

eroded. As a consequence, the Security Service Division, which is responsible to the Interior Department, has gained a preferential status at the army's expense. The net result is the creation of an atmosphere of tension and jealousy between these two groups.

Egyptian observers have told me that this state of affairs is in no way due to Sadat's loss of confidence in the army. He is well aware that as a group the army supports him, especially the official staff. Since the onset of the peace process and the opposition it evoked in the Arab world, it was decided to put stronger emphasis on internal security and the safeguarding of the regime. The fear of underground activity and of confrontations instigated with the assistance of Libyan, Palestinian, Iraqi or other agents, dictated the preference of the Security Service.

Even in the army, General Ali, who has a strong background in intelligence work, has replaced General Gamassi, one of the outstanding heroes of the October war. This is not all. It appears that during the past year scores of senior officers have been discharged from the Egyptian army. The senior command is very alert to the slightest sign of opposition, and they react immediately with preventive measures. Those in charge will not countenance the slightest sign or hint of danger. Anyone who is suspected of opposition to the peace process and to Sadat's conduct in the process is immediately discharged from the army.

There is an account of a group of senior military personnel who during the month of Ramadan this year made the customary pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia to observe their religious precepts. As is customary in a situation like this, the Saudi defense minister presented them with various gifts. This was enough to cast suspicion on them. Upon their return, they were all discharged from the army.

In contrast to this, I heard of an occurrence which is exactly the reverse of the incident with the Egyptian Army personnel. An Egyptian officer was a candidate for the position of editor of a new Saudi Army periodical. The first question asked by the Saudi minister of defense was whether the candidate had at any time taken part in peace talks with Israel, beginning with the talks at Km 101. He explained that anyone who had shaken hands with the Israelis was ineligible for the job. Another Egyptian general was discharged because an article he had written had been published in a Lebanese newspaper which opposes the peace process. Knowledgeable observers say it would be wrong to conclude from all this that an oppositional sentiment is crystallizing in the Egyptian Army vis-a-vis the peace process. Rather, it indicates a readiness and vigilance to stamp out any deviations. Summing up, the opinion today is that Sadat's control over the army is complete.

If there is any dissatisfaction in the Egyptian Army with anything related to the peace process it is not in essence the concept of peace with Israel. It is rather the keen disappointment that the process did not produce the expected fruit which the Egyptian military had anticipated. After a

protracted period of stagnation in large acquisition deals and putting up with sporadic purchases from the West, many senior officers hoped that salvation by the United States would come immediately after the peace. Now many are complaining about the scanty supplies the Egyptian Army is receiving from the United States and the slow rate in which even these are being received. They hoped that Western weaponry would quickly replace the outmoded Russian equipment. They demanded the same relationship and privileges that are accorded to the IDF in the purchase of sophisticated weaponry in the United States. Israel, of course, thinks just the opposite. The feeling in Israel is that the sale of attack weapons to Egypt, such as Phantom planes and armored troop carriers, is proceeding too rapidly.

Whatever the case may be, the fact remains that the great expectations were not fulfilled with the desired rapidity. Egyptian generals admit that in actuality speed was not essential in supplying all the needs of the large Egyptian Army. Clearly, the complete replacement of Russian equipment with American and Western weapons is not being considered. Such a plan would be wasteful and cost staggering amounts. Furthermore, it would take years to accomplish. The proposed American plan contains a practical concept applicable to a major portion of the Russian weapons systems now in Egypt's possession. It is a giant plan of parts replacement and substitution wherever this is efficient and productive. The day after Ezer Weizman, our defense minister, was honored in Egypt by a ceremony staged by the Egyptian general staff, an agreement was signed at that very same place by the Egyptian defense minister and the American assistant secretary of defense to create and develop a plan along these lines. AL AHRAM rightly considered it sufficiently important to warrant a headline.

The concept to transfer and substitute parts is well-known in the IDF. When it is no longer possible to acquire modern equipment in sufficient quantity to replace the present equipment which still retains a useful life, a restoration process is begun. Vital parts are replaced with later model units. This is exactly what we did with the Sherman, Centurion and captured Russian tanks. The cannons were made mobile. The same procedure was applied to the planes, e.g. a Sky Hawk motor was substituted in a French Mystere plane. This is what the Egyptians will do now, with American assistance, to some of their Russian weapons systems. We may assume that they will replace the Russian motors in their tanks with more modern American ones. The cannons may also be replaced. In a similar manner they will try to replace the engines in the Russian Migs. This replacement and substitution plan will result in significant employment in Egypt.

The American military assistance plan will not stop with the renovation of old weapons systems. It appears that the creation of a wide range of weapons systems is being considered besides parts and armament. Other items being considered are the manufacture of various types of electronic equipment, new classes of armament and antitank weaponry. In Cairo, I was told that the American Government has already certified the Emerson Co. to set up an assembly plant for the Thor missile to be used by the Egyptian Army.

The plans for equipping the army are but one facet of the search for a new Egyptian strategy in the face of the peace agreements with Israel. The crystallization of this strategy will determine how the Egyptians will rebuild their armed force and where the emphasis should be placed. The formulation of this strategy is of great interest to Israel. We can learn what the Egyptian intentions are and whether we should take their word at face value. It appears to me that the Egyptian general staff has erased the name of Israel from its list of potential threats against Egypt. We must repeat and emphasize that this cannot be interpreted as sufficient reason for Israel to erase Egypt from its list of future potential threats. Egypt is convinced or inducing itself to believe that following the peace agreement Israel will no longer initiate a threat against it. Israel has no intention of doing so. The expectation that this may happen in the foreseeable future is close to zero no matter how the regime is constituted.

From Israel's standpoint, the situation is understandably different. There is the fear of a sudden turnabout in Egypt or as Butrus Ghali the foreign minister has stated: Cairo will definitely decide that its defense treaties with other Arab states supersede the peace agreement with Israel.

The potential threats that are presently apparent to Egypt will probably crystallize from radical Russian elements in Lybia or the Sudan or an internal underground movement. At first glance it appears that the Libyan border presents the most serious threat. This because a ruler like Qadhdhafi is cooperating with the Russians and is amassing great quantities of arms far beyond his needs. He has in his country military advisors and pilots from all the extremist states.

Actually, the real threat to Egyptian interests will probably develop from an entirely different direction if and when the extremist segment gains control of the Sudan. It is situated at the source of Egypt's water supply. Any objectionable or inimical action in the Sudan brings an immediate and vigorous reaction in Cairo, (we shall return to this subject in article describing a visit to the Aswan Dam).

We have already discussed the internal danger. The answer obviously lies in a greater emphasis on the efficiency of the state's internal security organization. As for threats along its land borders, it is quite clear that it has no need for the large army that has been maintained previously, provided we can believe it has no designs on the Israeli front. All present signs in the area indicate it intends to decrease the forces in the future. However, this is a slow process and will take a few years. At present, its intention is expressed by zero growth in the army. Gaps are being left unfilled. Another significant indication is the fact that hundreds of officers are permitted to take off their uniforms and enter civilian life. Essentially, the difficulty lies in finding proper employment for these new entrants into civilian life. It appears that many have been discharged, and not only from the senior echelons. In summarizing, the intent is clearly to decrease the number of soldiers in the army but not the number of regiments. The plan is to modernize the army--to make it mobile with a high degree of preparedness.



Accordingly, in the framework of the new strategy the Egyptians will seek to develop an ability to intervene militarily in various spots in the Arab world and at greater distances. The plan is not for massive intervention but rather for the ability to deliver a rapid reply and to supply immediate help. For this reason, Egypt must build a long arm comprising adequate air power, many efficient transport planes, the ability to airlift specific weapons systems and the reinforcement of special forces units in the Egyptian Army. Judging from the readiness of the United States to sell Egypt quantities of Hercules planes we may infer that Washington is aware of this Egyptian objective and does not oppose it. It recognizes the old Egyptian striving to become a significant military factor in the Arab world.

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CSO: 4805

EGYPT

EGYPTIAN, ARAB REACTION TO DIPLOMATIC TIES VIEWED

Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 29 Oct 79 p 9

[Article by Ze'ev Schiff: "Tensions Heightening as the Moment for the Ambassadorial Exchange Approaches"]

[Text] In order to judge the changes Egypt is undergoing and the varying atmosphere in that great and populous country, I can advise nothing better than periodic visits every few months. One has the opportunity of renewing old friendships as well as meeting new people. The visitor has a chance to compare the present answers with views he has heard in the past. Today, significant changes have surfaced in Egypt. They are immediately apparent.

More so than in the past, there is evidences of new building construction. Many buildings are in various stages of construction. Some of them we remember seeing in their initial stages. Clearly the progress is slow, but the work is continuing apace. Near the airport, a new Sheraton hotel has been opened. In the city's center, finishing touches are being put on a new Hilton hotel, the Rameses. Nearby, a super highway has been built leading to the big October Bridge over the Nile.

After years of a boycott (due to the establishment of a bottling works in Israel) Coca Cola is again being sold in Cairo. Pepsi Cola no longer enjoys an exclusive market. Month by month, the American presence is becoming increasingly felt. Clearly, the American diplomats are setting the tone for the city. They are more knowledgeable about the Egyptian Army than anybody else. In addition to their active military attachés, there is a coordinator in the military mission who is engaged in military assistance. Whereas the military attaché is directly accountable to the intelligence unit in the Pentagon, the coordinator for some strange reason is accountable to the U.S. military command in Europe.

The presence of American tourists has become more apparent in various parts of the country. Different Western types have taken over the places in the casinos and at the roulette tables that were formerly occupied by sheikhs from the Persian Gulf kingdoms. Among these Westerners it is not unusual to find many whose pockets are overflowing with \$100 bills.

The great American Embassy in Cairo has adapted to the Egyptian and Muslim reality. Some time ago, it was decided to keep the embassy offices open on Sunday; traditionally, the day of rest for all Western embassies. The embassies are closed on Friday, the Moslem day of rest. The weekend for American diplomats has changed, and the embassy has adapted itself to Egyptian Government activities.

The Egyptian press, as in the past, is extensively engaged in the subject of Egypt's relations with the rest of the Arab world, the IDF withdrawal from the Sinai and the grandiose development plans of President Sadat. The tragedy in Cambodia receives scant notice. Many important Middle East issues do not receive adequate coverage in the Egyptian press. It is evident that in the framework of its relations with the Arab world, Egypt is approaching a crucial moment similar in importance to the Camp David agreements and the signing of a peace agreement. By that I mean the day in February 1980 when an Israeli ambassador is scheduled to arrive in Cairo and the first Egyptian ambassador will arrive in Tel Aviv. This will mark a significant crossroad in Sadat's relations with the Arab world. President Sadat has stated that he is inalterably determined to follow through with the diplomatic exchange.

There are those in Cairo who say that another important event will precede the ambassadorial exchange; that is, the moment when Sadat arrives at Saint Catherine's to lay the cornerstone at Mount Sinai for a mosque, a synagogue and a church. The religious element is not too happy with the projected spectacle. It will be interpreted in Saudi Arabia as further proof of the scorn in which he holds it and the Arab world.

The religious fanatics say that Islam teaches tolerance for monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity, but this can never be interpreted as meaning aid and assistance to other religions. This is how they view the spectacle of the erection of a synagogue and a church in conjunction with a mosque. This explanation is not widely accepted. Others say that the sore point with the Saudis is the return of Jerusalem to the bosom of Islam. To them, everything else is marginal. Whatever the case may be, it is already clear that the ceremony planned by Sadat will not be a grandiose as originally planned. It will be diminished into a symbolic gesture.

There are differing opinions about the wisdom of the conjunction of a mosque, synagogue and church, but there is a unanimity about the gravity of the day when the Israeli ambassador arrives in Cairo. Staff members are convinced that new steps to punish Egypt will be decided upon at the upcoming Arab summit meeting. They have already calculated the most likely hostile move---a number of the Arab states will expel a significant number of their Egyptian workers. This may entail some disruptions in their work force, but they cannot afford to countenance the presence of an Israeli ambassador without a retaliatory move. The editor of an Egyptian daily told me that their aim will be not so much to punish President Sadat as to hurt the Egyptian people as a whole.

Everyone with whom I discussed this subject is convinced that Sadat will not suffer this blow quietly. He will certainly resort to a new Egyptian nationwide poll to support any steps he may be considering against the other Arab states. The Americans, of course, are the ones who will be most concerned over this deterioration. They believe it was possible to prevent a heightening of the antagonisms in the relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It is interesting that they blame President Sadat for this deterioration. The Americans feel that Sadat lacked sensitivity and was not properly deferential in his relations with Saudi royalty. He insulted them and only subsequently did they reply. The American diplomats, first Eilits and now Atherton, have tried to persuade Sadat to be more circumspect in his dealings with the Saudis.

Clearly in Sadat's case, it is not merely a matter of proper deference and respect. Some say that the Saudis angered him when they pressured King Hassan of Morocco to break off diplomatic relations with Egypt and to join the rejectionist front. At this point Sadat saw red in his relations with Saudi Arabia. The story does not end here. The Egyptian Government continues to be irritated. Egyptian intelligence is convinced that the Saudis are attempting to influence Sudanese President Numayri to sever relations with Sadat, and are using their money for this purpose. It appears that they would like Numayri to stage an anti-Egyptian demonstration at the moment the ambassadorial exchange takes place between Israel and Egypt.

There is widespread speculation in the Egyptian capital as well as in Israel as to who will be the first Egyptian ambassador to Israel and also as to where the Israeli Embassy will be located in Cairo. Two names are being mentioned; Hassan Tohami, a presidential assistant who is currently a vice-premier. He is a religious mystic. He initiated the original meetings with Dayan in Morocco prior to Sadat's arrival in Jerusalem. The other is Thah Magdov, a general on leave. Since 1974 he has coordinated military contacts with Israel. He also acted as advisor to the Syrians in the negotiations with Israel for a cease-fire. At present, he is an ambassador at large and in the foreign office he is the administrator of the 'normalization' project between Israel and Egypt. Others feel that the post will go to a professional diplomat and that neither of the above-mentioned officials will be chosen.

Who the first ambassadors are is of small consequence. Clearly, the normalization process will not develop along the lines many Israelis expect. This coming February ambassadors will be exchanged, but the relations between Israel and Egypt will not be as normal as one would expect between two states who are common neighbors. Formally, they will conduct themselves according to the agreements. However, they will not waive their trump card of 'normalization' in just a few months. I have no doubt they will do all they can to slow the rapprochement. For example, I have been informed that El Al planes will not immediately be permitted to land in Cairo. The fact that diplomatic relations have been established between the two states does not imply that they will immediately begin to develop air

air connections. In this initial stage, the Egyptians would choose not to see El Al planes landing in Cairo. They would prefer charter or similar arrangements.

The Egyptian slowdown in the normalization process stems from inter-Arab causes and from some tactical considerations vis-a-vis Israel. An American in Cairo who is privy to everything happening there explained that in this situation the Egyptians are very apprehensive. It is very much like the young man who has decided to marry the ugly daughter of his wealthy employer. The wedding ceremony has been arranged and the dowry has been promised. The moment has arrived for the groom to be joined to the ugly daughter. This is the price and the Egyptians do not know how to adapt to the situation. It is a picturesque illustration and not very flattering to Israel. I have no doubt that many Egyptians feel this way.

Whatever the case may be, from Israel's standpoint it would be unwise for us to appear overly anxious to embrace somebody who recoils from us. There are more important things in the process of normalization--the exchange of ambassadors and cultural relations. There are matters of lesser importance. It would be foolish for us to set an inflated figure on something whose real value is insignificant. Most certainly, we must be careful not to allow Israeli tourists and sharp businessmen to engulf the Egyptians. This can be accomplished by limiting the licenses and exercising care to confine trade matters to the respective governments.

8995

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE REVIEWS LEBANON, IRAN, ISLAMIC WORLD

TA071505 Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 7 Dec 79 pp 1, 28 (Weekend Supplement) TA

[Interview with Chief of Intelligence, Maj Gen Yehoshu'a Sagi, at his office, by Eytan Haber--time not given]

[Text] Question: It has been reported in the media this week that 1,000 Iranian volunteers may arrive in southern Lebanon. Will such a thing happen?

Answer: In this period of instability which we are facing, even if I cannot confirm such reports then I can say that radical developments may take place, without any advance notice. We are in the midst of a process in which new alliances are being created and joint interests are being found between countries which could not see eye to eye in the past. On the other hand, there is a freeze and even a decline in the relations of countries which we used to regard as allies.

Question: Do we have any evidence of the imminent arrival of the Iranians?

Answer: To the best of my knowledge, there is no evidence for this in the field. However, I cannot rule out such a possibility. The Iranians may indeed send 1,000 or 2,000 well-equipped believers to southern Lebanon tomorrow.

Question: Are the Syrians interested in such a development?

Answer: I do not think that at this point the Syrians will be happy to see Iranian volunteers in Lebanon. The introduction of 1,000 Iranians means that a new element will arrive in Lebanon which will incite the southern area, since this area is inhabited by Shi'ites. I assume that Khomeyni will not send his Sunnis to Lebanon. One must understand: 1,000 or more Iranians in Lebanon will constitute an element of force pressuring the PLO to act. A conference was held in Tunis not very long ago. What was its main topic? Its main topic was the question of how to stop the PLO activities in southern Lebanon. The Lebanese only and unambiguous demand of the conference was: stop the PLO's activities. It will be possible to remove the Lebanese army to the south and gradually and slowly

achieve the reunification of Lebanon. An Iranian presence in Lebanon will stir up the area. The significance of such a development is, in fact, that the struggle does not favor President Sarkis today.

Question: Do PLO activities in southern Lebanon need the Syrian President's approval?

Answer: I would say just the opposite. Had Al-Asad not been interested in their activities, they would not be carried out.

Question: Only in Lebanon?

Answer: Certainly not. The same thing applies to the PLO in each and every site in the Middle East and concerning its activities in Europe. The PLO receives all its supplies and ammunition from Syria. Its training bases are located in Syria. The headquarters of the terror organizations are in Beirut, which is under Syrian control. The PLO is not as flexible and free in its activities as it used to be until not very long ago.

Question: Does it mean that the Syrians can also decide to massively step up terrorist activities against Israel? And if so, when is it going to happen?

Answer: This could happen if the Syrians decide that the present situation in the arena is uncomfortable. Why? Because of hundreds of reasons. Do you want a good reason? On 26 January two-thirds of the Sinai will be returned to Egypt. The Egyptians can then present this as an achievement to the Arab world. However, what can the Syrians say? On 26 February the Israeli ambassador will present his credentials to the Egyptian President. Is this a good enough reason? Egypt presents achievements while Syria, in its own way, has not accomplished anything.

Question: In his present condition, can Al-Asad allow himself to carry out massive activities against Israel?

Answer: Here is another good reason: Al-Asad is facing difficult domestic problems. He needs, perhaps, to show some action. Against whom? Against Israel. Public figures and other people are killed in Syria. Syria's prestige has recently declined first and foremost among the fighting Arab front. Syria stands isolated.

Question: And who is replacing it?

Answer: Iraq is striving to achieve a defense pact of the Persian Gulf states against Iran. If it succeeds, the inference on Syria is clear.

Question: At one time we used to say that, for example, the introduction of a foreign element into Jordan would constitute a reason for war. In your opinion what should Israel's military reaction to an Iranian presence in Lebanon be?

Answer: It depends on its composition. If 1,000 volunteers arrive equipped with light weapons, then we will have 16,000 terrorists in southern Lebanon instead of 15,000. However, if an Iranian armored brigade or a mechanized brigade or a commando brigade and its commanders moves into Lebanon, then we will have a problem!

Question: And how can this problem be solved?

Answer: I do not think this will be the situation. I believe that an organized group will not arrive. At the most, 1,000 Iranian volunteers will arrive. They will join the existing terrorist force in southern Lebanon. And what about us? We better not delude ourselves. Activities from Lebanon have not stopped, they have only grown more silent--not only because of Arab pressure but in the wake of our successes.

[TA071522] Question: Is it possible that we might see Iranian troops in the front in the next war? Will the next war be against the entire Muslim world?

Answer: First of all, at the moment there is no Iranian regular army. Out of the entire army existing during the shah's rule only the navy can reasonably be put into action. Today, there is hardly any general in the Iranian Army who also served as a general during the shah's rule. The present generals are people who were expelled from Iran and who sat in exile for 25 years, detached from any military activities. The qualifications currently demanded of Iranian generals are: religious devotion, loyalty to Khomeyni and nothing else.

Question: What about other Muslim countries? Will they participate in a war?

Answer: Along with Syria, Jordan, the terrorists in Lebanon and Egypt--which may have gotten out of the war circle--there are other countries in the region which we assume will participate in a war, such as Libya, Algeria and Kuwait.

Question: What about those countries which did not fight against us in the Yom Kippur War?

Answer: If the Muslim wave gains strength other Muslim countries which did not fight against us in the past may join the war. However, I do not think that this wave will gain strength for the time being because the Muslim-Shi'ite wave is already encountering a restraining opposition from the other faction of Islam, the Sunni Muslims.

Question: Where is the other kind of Islam awakened?

Answer: There is an awakening in Saudi Arabia, Iraq has carried out several operations, as well as certain countries in the Persian Gulf.



I think that something is also taking place in Syria despite their rapprochement with Iran. One should remember that Syria is ruled by the Alawite minority of the Sunni majority. These operations and activities constitute a red light to the Shi'ite wave. Therefore, this is the reason why I believe that the Syrians will not allow more than 1,000 Iranians into Lebanon.

Question: Is the Middle East on the threshold of a new era? Will Khomeynism spread to other Arab countries?

Answer: The upheaval in Iran has created a new situation in the Middle East. First of all, the military-strategic balance which existed for many years between the shah's army and the Iraqi army has disappeared. The balance of forces has disappeared and operational capabilities have been reduced. The enormous influence which a superpower such as the United States enjoyed--with which Iran completely identified as an ally--has disappeared. There were other countries in the Persian Gulf whose security policy entirely relied on the U.S. forces, whatever happened to the neighboring countries. This situation did not stand the test in the shah's case. The image of U.S. strength deteriorated. When such a thing happens to a country which relies on the United States, then it has a traumatic impact on other countries as well.

Question: Where, then, will Khomeynism lead? Will the other countries give in to him in a domino process?

Answer: The rise of religious regimes has an influence on some of the Persian Gulf countries, particularly on Iraq. Forty percent of the Iraqi population is Shi'ite. The domino process can also work in Kuwait and Bahrain where there are many Shi'ites. There are not many Shi'ites in Saudi Arabia. However, there are many aliens (1 million Yemenites, 200,000 Palestinians) who constitute a potential force for such activities. The rule existing at the time of the Roman Empire "If Sulla can, I can too" holds true in this case as well. If Khomeyni could make it in Teheran, why should I not do the same in Saudi Arabia and get rid of the royal family? Now one can also notice the rapprochement between Syria and Iran behind Iraq's back. I would not be surprised to see Iranian delegations arriving in Syria and vice versa. I would not be surprised if Iran gave economic aid to Syria. Why would Iran be interested in it? So the Syrians keep the Iraqis occupied. The Iraqis are the force hovering over Iran's head.

Question: What are the relations between the PLO and Khomeyni?

Answer: There is a stock exchange of terrorist organizations whose headquarters is in Beirut, mainly because the PLO has an advantage over the other groups. The PLO has physical bases in the field. Even before the shah was deposed the PLO had trained several hundred Iranians. The PLO provided them with arms even before the beginning of the disturbances

which brought about the collapse of the shah. There are reports about Palestinians who currently surround Khomeyni as his guards. 'Arafat himself patted his back in the first moments after Khomeyni's rise to power. As will be recalled, 'Arafat was allowed to have a representation there. A carpet was layed down for him, the same huge carpet which was woven for Hitler. That carpet made its way to Europe, was later purchased by the Iranian Jewish community as a present to the Israeli Embassy.

Question: Is it possible that the Palestinians helped the Iranians take over the U.S. Embassy?

Answer: In my opinion, the Palestinians are walking around the place. Who invented the trick of taking over embassies? However, it will also be true to say the PLO does not have a dominant influence on Khomeyni if their conceptions clash with those he holds. This influence did not work when 'Arafat asks him to concede on the issue of the shah. Why? Because we are not dealing here with a regime which recognizes world customs, diplomacy, a regime which differentiates between good and evil.

[TA071541] Question: Can Khomeynism influence the chances of peace with Egypt?

Answer: The phenomena accompanying Khomeynism could have an impact. The Middle East could find itself in a chaos of rivalries, regional wars and fighting arenas. Why? We may find ourselves in a chaotic situation where the Iraqis could try and impose a regional order, the Soviet Union could interfere and perhaps, the United States would have something to say. This state of affairs could create new situations which would affect Egypt.

Question: And will Al-Sadat fall from power?

Answer: In my opinion, so long as Al-Sadat remains the same persons and no new situations are created forcing him to make a choice between having peace or the collapse of his regime or an economic collapse he, as the Egyptian president, will continue to follow the same line he has taken so far--and he is not doing that badly!

Question: As chief of intelligence, do you ever wake up in the middle of the night bathed in cold sweat and think: To hell with it, perhaps all this is an unprecedented far-reaching camouflage plan?

Answer: I wake up in the middle of the night not necessarily covered by cold sweat but usually when the telephone rings.

Question: You have visited Egypt. Is it the same Egypt you imagined from the intelligence papers and reports?

Answer: Yes, to a certain extent. We have left several bases [in the Sinai], that of Umm Khushayb being the largest and the most famous.

ironically enough, those bases--and not others--we have recently given away were the ones in which we invested vast sums of money over the years. How much money? Billions of Israeli pounds! And Israeli pounds having the value of those days!

Question: Does the harm to our alert system add white hairs to your head?

Answer: It does not make black hair grow. However, it is important to note that immediately after Al-Sadat's visit, about 2 years ago, we began to plan the infrastructure for a new alert system. Therefore, today, we are in the midst of a process and not at its beginning.

Question: Is the eastern front considering war?

Answer: In my opinion, in the present conditions of a Jordanian-Syrian, Iraqi coalition the chances of war have decreased. However, this does not mean that war is not possible. A credibility crisis exists between Syria and Iraq. However, at the time, during their process of rapprochement, an infrastructure was built which can be renewed in a very short period of time.

Question: Excuse me for the rude word. Is this not a "conception."

Answer: No! This is a factual description! I emphasized that the existing infrastructure makes it possible to act in a very short period of time.

Question: The military infrastructure?

Answer: Both political and military. An infrastructure of roads, ports and contacts. These elements have recently been undergoing a process of disintegration. However, I repeat: This coalition can wake up again in a very short period of time. This does not look unreasonable in the present circumstances. However, one should ask what will happen if one of the countries--Syria, for example--sets out to war on its own. What will happen then? Will the other countries abandon it to its own fate?

Question: And what is your answer to your own question?

Answer: I believe that the other countries will not abandon it. We must take into consideration that in spite of all the hostility between Iraq and Syria, Iraq--and Jordan--will come to Syria's aid.

Question: Will Syria set out to war with Israel on its own?

Answer: A limited war with short-term targets could be possible perhaps with the intention of raising the problem, just as Egypt did in the Yom Kippur War.

Question: And what will Egypt do in such a case?

Answer: Egypt will then be faced with a problem since it has not revoked its signature on the Arab mutual assistance agreement. Egypt will certainly be asked to join the war. I assume that it will not participate in practice and will reluctantly make do with statements and condemnations. It will have to act in some way. This is the reason why I have frequently said that peace has to be put to the test of time and it should not be accepted as Moses bible. One cannot say: From now on this story is over.

Question: Is the eastern front prepared for war?

Answer: Indeed! Syria alone today has over 2,000 tanks compared to 1,500-1,600 tanks it had in the Yom Kippur War--and I am not talking about quality now. In 1973 the Syrians had two armored divisions, today they have four. The Jordanian Army was a defensive one mainly relying on infantry and armored units for counteroffensives. Today, it is a full offensive army, with mechanized and armored units and possessing excellent U.S. arms. Just as the IDF, the Jordanian Army is assisted by mobile artillery and anti-aircraft equipment. All these under an umbrella of batteries of ground-to-air missiles which did not exist in the past. Today they also have a small but very effective air force.

Question: And the Iraqis?

Answer: They had six divisions in the Yom Kippur War and today they have 2 divisions. Iraq has doubled its army and strength. The Iraqi Army has a fleet of carriers making possible the strategic movement of armored forces from Iraq on a very short notice. Iraq would today threaten us at least to the same extent as Jordan.

[TA071559] Question: Can a war start on the eastern front by pushing a button?

Answer: I do not believe so, if the reference is to a war of the eastern coalition--namely, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. If the reference is to Syria alone then the answer is positive, on certain forms of war, such as aerial fighting.

Question: Is the Syrian Army the most dangerous one?

Answer: The Syrian Army of the Yom Kippur War and that of today are two different armies. For example: If I am not mistaken, in the Yom Kippur War they had 300-400 "T-62" tanks whereas today this tank is present in all the armored divisions. They also have several dozens of tanks even more sophisticated than the T-62's.

Question: Do a few dozens of T-62's have any significance in the battle arena?

Answer: Yes. This is a sophisticated tank with a different quality of cannon and body. I also want to draw your attention to the deal Jordan

has made on receiving 275 Chieftain tanks, which means that an excellent tank is introduced in the arena. Let us return to the Syrian Army: a vast part of their armored divisions is equipped with "B.M.P." troop-carriers which do not only carry personnel. This is a vehicle also equipped with a cannon. They had only 100-200 vehicles of this kind in the Yom Kippur War, not to mention the Syrian Air Force which is today formed by MIG-21's, Sukhoi-22's which did not exist then and MIG-25's as interceptors at high altitudes.

Question: Will the terrorists appear as an army in an additional war?

Answer: I do not think so. In the internal arena, [sentence apparently dropped] terrorists in other numbers. It is more dangerous to us if they appear in small units.

Question: Will it be true to say that there has been a significant decline in terrorist activities?

Answer: I do not think so. In the internal arena--both in the territories and in Israel--the security forces have been more successful in averting terrorists acts and that is why it seems as if there is a decline in their activity. There has been no decline in sabotage acts carried out from the sea. On the contrary, there have already been four maritime operations since the terrorist act in Nahariya in April 1979. One should remember that in the past there were longer intervals between maritime operations. Several years have gone by since their landing at the Tel Aviv beach in March 1975 until another unit landed in Tel Aviv's marine and another group reached the coastal road.

Question: What does the terrorists' navy look like?

Answer: Naval units train in Lebanon. They have boats, both motherships and rubber boats, kayaks and even air-filled mattresses. Anything that floats serves them as a vehicle. They also learn their lessons and try not to repeat the same errors. Their targets have also changed. Their purpose is no longer to take hostages, but to kill and kidnap.

Question: The fact that the PLO wants to put 'Isam Sirtawi on trial because he accepted a common award with Arye Eli'av--does it indicate the existence of a moderate PLO and of differences of opinion within the PLO between doves and hawks?

Answer: So far, I have not succeeded in locating a moderate PLO. On the other hand, I have spotted their intelligence in conveying their message to the world. Please notice how they only talk about the establishment of a democratic state without saying a word that it is their intention to set up such a state on the entire territory of Eretz Yisra'el. The PLO has not softened its positions, it has only formulated them in a more sophisticated way. We conducted an analysis to check whether the PLO had undergone any changes and we did not find any appeasing tones.

Question: There was a junior lieutenant Siman-tov in the Yom Kippur War who sounded the alarm. As chief of intelligence, could such a man make his way to you today?

Answer: By the way, that famous lieutenant Siman-tov was reared by me. I taught him when I served as intelligence officer in the southern command. As for your question: when it comes to issues of assessment, every officer can make his way to me. Whoever has any reservations as far as assessment is concerned reaches me. There have been cases where junior officers reached me. This custom was introduced when Shlomo Gazit served as chief of intelligence.

Question: Does the image of a weak and unstable Israel provoke any ideas among our enemies?

Answer: The image of a weak and unstable state may indeed constitute a bait and a consideration in the decision-making process of the Arab countries.

CSO: 4805

ISRAEL

BRIEFS

UNEMPLOYMENT SITUATION--The demand for workers in November 1979 has reached 27,000--1,000 less than in November 1978. The employment service says that there is still a demand in Israel for more than 5,000 workers, compared with a demand for 10,000 last year. Labor and Social Betterment Minister Yisra'el Katz has told our correspondent Yig'al Rom that this data does not merit talk about a wave of dismissals, and added that unemployment is distant. In November 1979, only 1,050 people received unemployment payments. Minister Yisra'el Jatz made these statements during a tour of the Bet Shemesh Engine Company. [Text] [TA061723 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1600 GMT 6 Dec 79 TA]

INCREASED INTEREST RATES--In 15 days, on 9 December, the bank interest will be increased 15 percent. Then the interest for unapproved overdrafts will be 130 percent. The banks' decision to raise the interest rate has been made in light of the recent steps taken by the cabinet. About 10 days ago, on 15 November, the interest rate was increased 10 percent. The basic commercial interest has now, after the increase, reached 80 percent, but one should add 4 percent commission for allocating credit. All in all, the basic interest will be 84 percent. The banks have also decided to raise the interest rates for extraordinary overdrafts by a further 15 percent. In other words, in addition to the basic 84 percent, there will be an additional 45 percent interest rate on unapproved overdrafts instead of the 30 percent demanded currently, in total, 130 percent. The banking system currently suffers a 6.5 billion pound liquidity deficit. The fines which the banks currently pay for exceeding the volume of credit given them by the Bank of Israel have in effect reached 250 percent, so that the banks are interested in moderating the demand for credit. [Excerpt] [TA231207 Beni Baraq, Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT in Hebrew 23 Nov 79 p 3 TA]

NEW SETTLEMENT HOUSING--According to the Jewish Agency Settlement Department there will be about 40,000 families in Judaea and Samaria at the end of the 5-year autonomy period. I learned about this yesterday from the settlement department's chairman, Matityahu Drobles. About 5,000 apartments will be constructed in Judaea and Samaria this year. According to Drobles' plan, the apartments will be built by private contractors who will receive political guarantees from the government against the possibility of a change in the status of the area. The government will also buy from the contractors all the apartments that cannot be sold on the free market. Drobles also proposes that the government give the contractors about 30 percent of the cost of the project as an advance payment before beginning work. [TA281214 Tel Aviv 'AL HAMISHMAR in Hebrew 28 Nov 79 p 1 TA]

CSO: 4805

KUWAIT

UNITED STATES WILL EXPLOIT IRAN CRISIS FOR ITS OWN INTERESTS

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 9 Nov 79 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "U.S. Embassy and Gulf"]

[Text] It is certain that the potentials projected by the new Iranian-U.S. crisis bear within their folds dimensions that are difficult to determine now and that do not seem confined to the framework of an embassy and the release of hostages but that will go beyond this framework to affect the situation in the Gulf area generally.

The Iranians know definitely that the demand for handing over the shah in return for evacuating the embassy cannot and will not be met for several considerations, the first being the fact that a country like the United States will not permit its prestige to be trampled in this manner even though it knows that many condemn its foreign policy altogether, and particularly in the Middle East.

Therefore, it must be that this Iranian demonstration is seeking to achieve realistic goals behind the occupation of the embassy. Perhaps these goals are connected with the domestic Iranian conditions and need such a big stone [sic]. It is most likely that the Iranian leadership's fears intensified after the shah's transfer to a New York hospital for treatment and that the Iranian memory recalled the possibility of restoring the shah to the peacock crown, as happened in 1953.

The appeal which Imam Khomeyni has addressed to his people in a live broadcast and in which he told them "do not fear" is interesting. This indicates that there is concern over mysterious events that will take place as a consequence of the embassy seizure.

Naturally, the United States will not let this issue pass without trying to exploit it in its interest at the level of the entire Gulf because this issue may provide it with the pretext to claim that matters in the Gulf, which is considered one of its most vital interests, as it always says, are not as well as they should be and that, therefore, arrangements must be made to enable the U.S. fist to move and to strike more swiftly and precisely.



It is most likely that the U.S. ears are fully attentive to the Israeli advice in this regard. Perhaps the film "Entebbe Operation" will be shown anew and other similar stories will be repeated. However, those who find it unlikely that the United States will embark on direct military action concerning the embassy issue do not find it unlikely, and even assume, that as a result of this operation [embassy seizure], the Washington administration will push the Gulf situation to the brink. Many believe that Washington has been waiting for an occasion--perhaps like this one--to embark on such an effort.

This is why some say that Washington "has permitted" the shah to get sick in New York so that events may follow one another in quick succession and so that the door to the crisis may be opened.

This is fundamentally Kissinger's way of leading crises toward the explosion point and of then moving to make new arrangements.

Perhaps all the current moves concerning this issue and revolving around it bear in their folds the features of a crossing toward a new situation which is still ambiguous.

At best, it is inevitable that what has happened--in the light of the development of events and of the future consequences--will project equations and will produce convictions and visualizations connected with the calculations of all the forces in the area.

The Americans, especially in cases like this one, never ask anybody about carrying out their decisions. In this regard, Kissinger says in his memoirs that when the 1970 events in Jordan and the Syrian military intervention were discussed, it had been decided that an Israeli military move would be staged to counter the Syrians. When some people said that King Husayn's opinion had to be explored, Kissinger's opinion was: "We should not risk King Husayn's position by asking him a question he cannot answer. He may approve that which he can never ask for,"

This means that the U.S. policy planners make assumptions that serve their interests and carry out these assumptions on the basis of fait accompli on the one hand and the basis that the other side approves these assumptions, without asking for them, on the other hand. In the light of this theory, the U.S. policy can be understood and then anything can be expected.

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CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

AMERICAN LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF MIDDLE EAST DECRIED

Kuwait AL-RA'Y AL-'AMM in Arabic 8 Nov 79 pp 1, 19

[Editorial: "Occupied United States and Palestine"]

[Text] If there is a benefit in occupying the U.S. Embassy in Teheran and threatening the life of its workers, then this benefit is summed up, at least, in having the Americans taste occupation, even if it is only the occupation of their embassy, and feel, both as rulers and citizens, the gravity of having the life of some of their citizens threatened. They may thus understand the meaning of the occupation of a homeland, evicting its people and threatening the lives of thousands of its citizens, i.e., understand the meaning of the occupation of Palestine, of denying its people their right to their homeland and their sovereignty over it and of denying its citizens a guarantee against threats, terrorization and murder.

It is nothing more than an embassy and several dozen Americans. However, the matter constitutes in its deep sense some kind of occupation of U.S. territory. This calls on Washington to understand truly, or at least logically, the rejection by peoples, including the Palestinian people, of the aggression committed against them. It is an opportunity for the United States to learn how to deal with and how to reach people through mutual respect and through recognition of peoples' rights and not through plotting, oppression and the backing of oppression. Nobody is by nature an enemy of the United States. The United States itself creates against itself all these enemies who are justified in their hostility because they possess nothing other than this hostility with which to defend themselves, their rights and their homelands.

Perhaps the strangest U.S. theory, despite all the facts to the contrary, is the ludicrous statement made by Harold Sounders, one of the top U.S. officials, on the goals of the U.S. policy in the Middle East. He has said: "The goal of our presence in the area is--verbatim--to help its states to preserve their independence against any foreign intervention,"

Who can believe such words when he sees quite the opposite and when he sees that the "foreign intervention" that threatens the independence of the area states emanates more from the United States--and with its Israel, its spearhead--than from any other country?

How can we believe such a claim when we have been witnessing daily throughout the past 30 years that the usurpation of Palestine took place under the U.S. patronage and that this usurpation is still growing and escalating under this patronage and through the U.S. weapons delivered to Israel?

Moreover, what are these "independences" that are "protected" by the United States and how can they continue to be "independences" as long as they need the U.S. "help?"

If Washington were truly working to provide this help, it would have prevented Israel from occupying territories, it would have stopped supporting and adopting the Israeli expansion and would have withheld from Israel weapons that cannot be countered and that can shoot down Arab aircraft from a distance of 10 kilometers.

Despite all the potentials of danger, we cannot but support whoever reminds the United States that a certain tree could not reach its God so that this American tree may perhaps remember and learn that Palestine is under no condition less important than its embassy in Teheran and that the American hostages held there are not more important than the Palestinian people who want nothing more than their homeland and their right to life, sovereignty and freedom--nothing more.

But despite this, we do not believe that the United States will remember, not even if it is true--and we hope that it is true--that the PLO will mediate with the Teheran authorities to release the U.S. citizens. This is because we are certain that even if the PLO lights its 10 fingers and covers its face with all the cosmetics in the world, the United States would still not want it unless the PLO agrees with the wishes of the States, i.e., none of Palestine [for the Palestinian state]. Ultimately, the issue is connected with two antitheses: The United States, for countless reasons, cannot be with us and with right. Therefore, it is against Palestine, the PLO and the Arabs.

Therefore, dealings with the United States are no longer subject to multiple choices. It seems that those who have taken the only choice, though being the desperate choice, are the ones who have succeeded and triumphed.

8494

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KUWAIT

'AL-SIYASAH' WARNS OF IRANIAN CRISIS' POTENTIAL FOR DISASTER

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 11 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "Exorbitant Price That World May Pay for Head of Man Who Is About To Die"]

[Text] Internationally, what has happened in Iran cannot be accepted because it constitutes a violation of international traditions and usage, especially since the official Iranian administration blesses what has happened, namely occupation of the U.S. Embassy. It has been customary for such a violation of diplomatic traditions to come from irresponsible circles and for the crisis to be then settled through cooperation between the local authorities and the victimized party.

The issue here is not one of testing the Iranian strength against the U.S. strength. The comparison is not valid and has no foundation because the circumstances are different. Iran on its part continues to be capable of moving in any direction it deems fit, even if it violates international traditions and usage and the logic of international relations whereas the United States cannot, on its part, move except through the rules of the sequence of authority through the Congress, the intelligence, the army class [establishment] or the White House experts.

It is true that Teheran's and Washington's conditions are different insofar as the degree of flexibility of each of them is concerned but there is no doubt that the ultimate loser is world confidence in the Iranian policy which will not realize, regardless of what it does, its demand of having the shah handed over--not even if a third world war erupts. Handing over the shah by a democratic country, and by a country like the United States in particular, is something that goes through channels which everybody knows are complicated channels. Any simple political thinker understands before hand that the end will not be this simple. Those occupying the U.S. Embassy have not demanded the handing over of the shah from an African state or from one of those states whose dictionaries contain a thousand and one hundred meanings and justifications for the phrase "public interest." In the United States, there is no such a thing as public interest as long as the law is clear and its controls are apparent. Therefore, Iran will be the losing side in the dangerous game. Carter has already initiated his plans

to incite the U.S. public opinion against Iran and to put the Congress under a national pressure that allows him to act flexibly and in freedom from the legislative authority's pressure. The shah's issue may turn into a challenge under which Carter finds himself facing local U.S. pressure to keep the shah in the United States, having conducted a campaign to arouse sympathy in the shah's interest. It is enough now that there are demonstrations in the United States against the current Iranian regime. These demonstrations are different from the ones staged a few months ago in support of what had happened in Iran and demanding that the shah be refused asylum in the United States. The situation has now changed in favor of the shah.

On the other hand, there may be other arrangements which involve the elements of a challenge between the U.S. strength and the Iranian strength and which may move matters toward the dangerous phase. This is what the Iranian regime should realize so that the world may [not] find itself compelled to pay an exorbitant price for the head of a man who is about to die.

The issue is ultimately one of principles. In years past, Algeria was destroyed because the French ambassador had been insulted at a meeting with the ruler of Algeria. Yes, the situation is dangerous insofar as all the potentials are concerned. The Iranian regime is supposed to reconsider its calculations not to push danger away from itself but to maintain the trust it enjoys as a state in the international community.

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CSO: 4802

KUWAIT

EDITORIAL SPECULATES ON KHOMEYNI'S ROLE

Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 12 Nov 79 p 1

[Editorial by Ahmad al-Jarallah: "What If Khomeyni Disappears Now"]

[Text] It is evident from the interview given by outgoing Iranian Prime Minister Bazargan to the Italian paper (ORIANA FILACCI) that the situation in Iran is governed by a general feeling among all those who helped the revolution or those who danced and cheered for it that any one of them has the right to hold the reins in Iran. This is a feeling that even the revolution leader finds difficult to restrain.

Before coming into existence, the Iranian revolution needed alternative cadres to take control of affairs so that power may not be divided among numerous blocs, each of which believes that its theories are the best and that it is the bloc close to Khomeyni, the revolution leader. Even though the Iranian leadership feels that all are important, getting matters under control will continue to need a position that clashes with extremely delicate sentiments and feelings. Getting matters under control will have to inevitably be at the expense of some factions that have found in the revolution a gain that may not be material but an emotional one--a gain whereby some people are content to be able to raise their voice calling for the shah's death or perhaps for dragging Carter and confronting the United States.

Insofar as the domestic Iranian situation is concerned, Bazargan's interview contains a succinct summary of what all, including the leadership itself, are suffering. There is no doubt that the Iranian leadership truly desires to set matters aright. But the ecstasy of the situation whose events have blown on Iran swiftly continues to intoxicate many people who cling to their weapons and find pleasure in shouting against the shah--even though he is no longer an issue--and against Carter, the United States and imperialism! These are people who have been whispering their sentiments for 30 years and who have now gotten a sudden opportunity to raise their voices. These people cannot be guided easily now. The situation will be critical if Khomeyni disappears from the stage of the country whose people are still intoxicated by what has happened.

8494

CS0: 4802

LEBANON

BRIEFS

SARKIS TO VISIT MOSCOW, WASHINGTON--Lebanese front information sources have said that President Ilyas Sarkis will visit the United States, the Soviet Union and some European capitals to explain the situation in Lebanon and the need to preserve its safety and independence, because any failure to do so would constitute a danger to the security of the area and the world. [Excerpt] [LD071625 London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 4 Dec 79 p 1 LD]

CSO: 4802

SAUDI ARABIA

KING REAFFIRMS SUPPORT FOR PALESTINIANS

Paris AL-MUSTAQBAL in Arabic 10 Nov 79 pp 15-16

[Article: "King Khalid and the Two Palestinian Positions"]

[Text] In the course of 10 days, King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz placed on record two positions which mean a great deal for the Palestinian cause. The two positions originate from the same conviction.

The first position came in some remarks which the Saudi monarch made to pilgrims on 27 October. He said: "The Islamic nation is firmly resolved to regain our occupied lands, especially the exalted city of Jerusalem, and obtain the return of the legitimate rights to our Palestinian bretheran, and we will use all possible means to achieve these goals."

The second position appeared in a telegram which King Khalid ibn 'Abd-al-Aziz sent to the "World Conference of Solidarity With the Arab People and and Its Central Cause, Palestine." In this telegram, the king reiterated Saudi Arabia's support for the Palestinian people's struggle to regain their homeland and their rights--especially Jerusalem--and indicated that the resources of his country will continue to be dedicated to the service of the causes of Arab destiny.

It is interesting that King Khalid's telegram to the conference, which was held in Lisbon, was read along with similar telegrams of support from Brezhnev, Tito, King Husayn, King Hassan II, President Habib Bourguiba and the leaders of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Greece.

It is also interesting that King Khalid assigned the Saudi ambassador in Madrid to go to Lisbon and read the telegram in person, rather than allowing it to be read by proxy.

In the context of Saudi concern for the Palestinians, the PALESTINE NEWS AGENCY (WAFA) stated that Saudi Arabia has decided to give the PLO a donation of \$2 million to complete the final phase of construction of a home for children of Palestinian martyrs and activists in Syria.

This home, which will be named after the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia, will cost a total of \$5 million. The kingdom paid \$1 million when construction on the home began and will pay the additional \$2 million soon.

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SAUDI ARABIA

CONTRACT FOR LARGE FERTILIZER PROJECT SIGNED

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 8 Nov 79 p 2

[Article by Sultan al-Bazi'i: "Signing of \$300-Million Contract for Fertilizer Project; Methanol Project Contract To Be Signed Within 3 Weeks With Construction To Begin in Early 1980"]

[Text] During the first week of December, a contract will be signed between the Saudi Basic Industries Company (SABIC) and the Chinese Fertilizer Company for a joint fertilizer project which will be established in al-Jubayl and will produce 500,000 tons of urea annually. Construction on the project is expected to begin during 1980. AL-RIYAD has learned that the project will cost \$300 million.

This information came in a statement to AL-RIYAD by Engineer 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Zamil, vice chairman and appointed member of SABIC's board of directors. The entire output of the project will be for export, and the Taiwanese partner has pledged to buy 60 percent of the project's production for use in Taiwan.

In addition, Engineer al-Zamil told AL-RIYAD that the contract for methanol production project approved between SABIC and a Japanese group will be signed within 3 weeks, with construction to begin in early 1980. Eight Saudi engineers have completed training periods in Japan ranging from 1 to 2 years. They will participate in the work of the project from the beginning. It is worth mentioning that the project will employ a maximum of 180 workers. According to Engineer al-Zamil, this will facilitate the process of placing Saudis in these jobs after they have undergone training.

The project will have a production capacity of 2,000 tons of synthetic methanol per day. The cost of the project is estimated at 900 million Saudi riyals. Construction is expected to take 3 years with production beginning early in 1983.

The substance methanol is used in many manufacturing industries. It is converted into methyl chloride, which is used in the production of synthetic rubber and substances used in the cosmetics and drug industries to prevent

water absorption. It is also used as a substitute for starch and in paint products and adhesives, and is converted into acetic acid which is used in the manufacture of plastics and adhesives. In addition, methanol is converted into formaldehyde which is used as a glycerine substitute, in the manufacture of synthetic sponges, in the manufacture of adhesives for the construction and wood products industries, in the manufacture of plastics used in the electric industries and in household utensils and paints, and in the soil improvement industry.

Meanwhile, AL-RIYAD has learned that a meeting will be held in December between SABIC and Shell Oil Company officials to deal with some details of an agreement whereby Shell Oil Company will participate with SABIC in the construction of a petrochemical complex to produce ethylene, styrene, ethylene dichloride, crude synthetic ethanol and caustic soda.

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SAUDI ARABIA

BRIEFS

AIRPORT CONSTRUCTION--Some 316 million riyals will be spent for the construction of new buildings and lounges at the Jiddah, Dhahran and Riyadh airports. These facilities are needed to improve services at the airports in view of the constant increase in the number of travellers to the kingdom. Meanwhile, the General Administration for Civil Aviation is expected to complete the first phase of the new Jiddah International Airport sometime next year, in addition to constructing international airports in Riyadh and Dhahran. Contracts for the preparation of studies and plans for the latter two airports have already been awarded. In the same field, small airports have been constructed at Ha'il, Badanah and Abha at a total cost of 628 million riyals, and the development of the al-Qasim airport is expected to be completed soon at a cost of 113 million riyals. In addition, construction has been completed on new buildings and passenger lounges at the al-Ta'if and Tabuk airports at a cost of 87 million riyals, and the necessary studies are now in progress for the construction of new airports at al-Ta'if, Tarif, al-Khafaji and al-Qaryat. [Text] [Jiddah 'UKAZ in Arabic 13 Oct 79 p 4] 8591

SOUTH KOREAN TROOPS--The number of South Korean "workers" in Saudi Arabia has topped 100,000, and this figure is expected to reach 250,000 as the 1980's begin. These South Koreans live in special camps and are not allowed to mix with citizens. Their companies provide them with private means of transportation. Some sources say that these South Koreans are merely substitutes for the hundreds of thousands of Arab workers who constitute an "ideological threat to the regime." Other sources assert that these Koreans have connections with security and are none other than trained troops ready to intervene and protect imperialist interests in Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf. Their activity has apparently been on the increase recently. Some high-ranking officers and military advisors have been attached to the troops, and the South Korean company Shin Han International has recently received a \$178.4 million contract to oversee the construction of buildings for the King 'Abd-al-'Aziz Military Academy, which will be located hundreds of kilometers northwest of Riyadh. The contract was signed with the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation. [Text] [Beirut AL-HADAF in Arabic 10 Nov 79 p 31] 8591

CSO: 4802

SUDAN

OUSTED FIRST VICE PRESIDENT WORKS AGAINST REGIME

London AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 4-10 Nov 79 p 19

[Article: "Power Struggle in Sudan"]

[Text] Before his dismissal from office, Abu al-Qasim struggled with several different sides, from al-Sadiq al-Mahdi on the one hand to al-Turabi on the other, and imagined that as first vice president he was in a position to play a larger role in the Arab sphere. He was constantly launching attacks against one or the other of these two individuals in order to destroy the points of contact among Numayri, al-Turabi and al-Sadiq al-Mahdi.

The struggle grew to the point that Abu al-Qasim felt the regime was on the verge of collapse, and so he chose to step up the pace in order to escalate these struggles and settle them in his favor. He exploited the issue of civil service reform and wage increases to get the workers and civil servants on his side, irrespective of his ability to fulfill his commitments, which ran as high as 50 percent. He knew that the regime could not afford such an increase, but he was seeking to adopt a position which was more political than economic. Numayri undoubtedly refused to put this reform into effect.

Another struggle took place between the first vice president and the old May Revolutionists, Khalid Hasan 'Abbas and Ma'mun 'Awad Abu Zayd, in addition to a struggle with 'Umar al-Tayyib and 'Abd-al-Majid Hamid Khalil. Through all these stages, Numayri was unable to control the fighting. He was plagued by vacillation in his position caused by his personal weakness and the ease with which he could be influenced by any side.

While this struggle was escalating in this manner, another struggle was going on in the streets among the masses. They bypassed the organizations which traditionally supported the regime, such as the Teachers Union, and submitted their problems to the regime. In its general assembly, the Doctors Union headed by Harith Hamad, a Numayri supporter, adopted a position which opposed the regime on union and political issues. Similarly, the Federation of Farmers in Sudan bypassed the official cadres

friendly to the regime, while in the labor cadre, movements arose which were remote from the official representatives. These examples indicate that the masses have bypassed the obstacles of the official unions and have raised problems and issues directly.

As a result of these pressures, Numayri attempted to offer sacrifices and victims. He made a direct attack on the Socialist Union in one of his speeches, and then removed Abu al-Qasim from power in order to make the people believe that, as secretary general of the Socialist Union, Abu al-Qasim was responsible for everything.

#### Shift of the Struggle

The struggle shifted into a more practical phase when Abu al-Qasim began fighting with Rashi al-Tahir, Yahya 'Abd-al-Majid, and the successor to Kawjali Hasan 'Abidin, Amal 'Abbas--prominent personalities whom Abu al-Qasim had used as extensions of himself within the Socialist Union. Thus, Rashid al-Tahir joined 'Umar al-Tayyib and Hasan al-Turabi in an alliance against Abu al-Qasim, in spite of the existence of mutual conflicts among the three men. The practical nature of the struggle manifested itself in the confrontation between the Federation of Sudanese Labor Unions and the regime following 6 years of silence and complete disregard of labor issues as a result of the federation's former blind loyalty to the ousted first vice president.

However, this move is interpreted as an attempt to adopt a heroic position and brandish the strike weapon so that the opposition labor leaders would embrace it and be ousted politically or arrested, and the federation could enter the elections without competition. The other obvious goal is to express Abu al-Qasim's feelings toward the regime in order to weaken and slander it. However, Numayri was able to abort the strike action by directly threatening those responsible for it. He threatened to expose the leaders, who had amassed excessive wealth and used public funds for their own personal interests, before their base of support and the people. The federation responded to this sort of pressure and lifted the strike unconditionally.

We can say that Rashi al-Tahir, the foreign minister and secretary of the organizations, is in a position to strike at the labor leadership which supports Abu al-Qasim. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, on the other hand, is unable to exploit this opportunity. He was surprised by the dismissal of the first vice president without his having found the means to influence subsequent decisions of Numayri and win him over to his side--despite the fact that al-Sadiq is constantly being proposed by himself and others as a potential replacement for president of the republic, compelled by his personal ambitions as well as his foreign connections. But al-Sadiq lacks a firm foothold both at the popular level and within the regime because of his dissociation of himself from his base of support. Now that the regime has dismissed him from the Political Office, al-Sadiq wants to reestablish close ties with the Ansars in an effort to reconsider his old political

position. In Jazirah Aba, the spiritual capital of the Ansars, al-Sadiq attempted to bring the Ansars together with their principal leaders in order to offer himself as their imam, however, the death of the mother of Ahmad al-Mahdi, al Sadiq's uncle, as well as the basic opposition to such a step on the part of the Ansars themselves, forced him to change his plans.

#### The Opposition

The opposition movement is represented by the recent series of strikes, which bore the stamp of coordination in their raising of nationalist issues that were far removed from such narrow class issues as the lowering of prices and civil service reform. There is a trend for the opposition forces to meet in coordinating committees, as was done recently at Khartoum University, and propose a formula for an alliance joining all the forces into a single front against the regime and the Moslem Brotherhood. This alliance has assumed practical forms, and its first result was the beginning of a loosening of the Brotherhood's control over the university in Khartoum.

There is also an alliance within the ranks of professionals and civil servants, as well as in the workers cadre. The aim of this is to join opposition forces into a single front to strike at the regime forcefully in one thrust as opposed to scattered actions. At the political level, rapid efforts are being made to join opposition forces into one central leadership domestically and abroad, and work is underway to make this leadership successful and bring it into the practical realm in view of the international struggles which are enveloping Sudan from all sides.

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CSO: 4802

SULTANATE OF OMAN

FIRST 3 YEARS OF 5-YEAR PLAN SHOW GOOD RESULTS

Oman 'UMAN in Arabic 18 Nov 79 pp 22 and 23

[Test] After the development council was established in 1974 under sultanic decree no. 41 of 1974, one of its first acts was to adopt a resolution, on 9 February 1975, designating the goals and policy of development in the sultanate, that is to say, the long-term strategy. The authorization of this decree and the issuance of its full text were done in the document of the first 5-year development plan.

The long-term strategy may be described as a collection of goals with a general character which defines the directions toward which it is desired that the movement of economic development should progress and which can be arrived at through successive short-term plans, or 5-year plans, which will be, as it were, a detailed translation of the long-term goals and in keeping with the temporary circumstances of each of these plans.

Now that 3 years, 1976, 1977, and 1978, have passed since the authorization of the first 5-year development plan and the fourth year, 1979, is coming to an end, work has begun in earnest on the preparation of the second 5-year development plan, for the years 1981 to 1985, and, as is the case with the first 5-year development plan, the goals and policy of the second will be derived from the long-term goals and devoted to them in such a manner as to be in accord with the existing possibilities or those possibilities which can be found during that period and with the priorities which are appropriate to it.

The Principal Goals and Accomplishments

The first 5-year plan included ways and means by which it is possible to achieve the goals which were set forth in it as a step toward achieving the long-term goals. From the reports of the follow-up of the execution of the first 3 years, 1976 to 1978, it can be said that the results which have been achieved have been satisfactory and that the movement of development is following the desired direction and making successful strides toward the achievement of the long-term goals.

The following text is a brief review of the accomplishments which have

been made during the first three years toward the attainment of those goals.

The first goal is to work on the development of new sources of national income besides the petroleum revenues, with which to replace them in the future. In fact, the proportion of the petroleum sector dropped to about 6 percent of the gross national product in 1978, as compared with about 7 percent in 1975, whereas the relative importance of the rest of the economic sectors increased to about 44 percent in 1978, as compared with about 33 percent in 1975.

The second goal is to increase the proportion of developments which yield revenue, especially in the fields of industry, mining, agriculture, and fishing. In fact, this goal is considered bound up entirely with the preceding goal, and indeed it may be said that it is not possible to achieve the first goal without achieving this one.

The third goal of the plan is to distribute the developments geographically in a manner which will be advantageous to the several regions of the country and to all of the people in them and so that it will eliminate the disparity in the standard of living of these areas, with the elimination of special priorities for the least advanced regions at the present time.

The fourth goal of the plan is to support and develop the existing centers of population, preserving them from the danger of mass migrations to the dense centers of concentration of population, and to preserve the environment.

The fifth goal is to devote attention to water resources by considering them a vital element in the continuation and course of economic activity. This goal is confined to two principal elements: providing water for the inhabitants in all regions of the sultanate.

The sixth goal is to devote attention to the development of domestic manpower so that the people can undertake their roles fully in the national economy.

The seventh goal is to complete the form of the basic structure. In this field, during the first 3 years of the plan, the government has undertaken to carry out developments totaling 260 million Omani riyals. The effects of these developments have been reflected in the following fields:

Roads: The length of the first-class asphalt roads was 1,587 kilometers in 1978, as compared with 708 kilometers in 1975, and the length of the second-class graded roads was 12,151 kilometers in 1978 as compared with 5,495 kilometers in 1975.

Harbors: During the period of 1976 to 1978, the sum of 26 million riyals was spent on widening and deepening the existing harbors, especially Qabus



and Raysut harbors. Work is in progress to improve Raysut harbor by dredging deep anchorages, and the completion of it is expected in 1980. The capacity of Qabus harbor is 1.5 million tons per year at the present time, and that of Raysut harbor is expected to be 600,000 tons per year when work is completed on it.

Air fields: During the period from 1976 to 1978, the sum of 12.1 riyals was spent to enlarge the air fields of al-Sib and al-Salalah and provide them with the most modern equipment. Al-Sib international airport began to accommodate 27,300 flights in 1978, as compared with 15,000 in 1975.

Electricity: The production capacity of the electrical power stations throughout the several parts of the sultanate increased from 91 megawatts in 1975 to 206 megawatts in 1978. Work is in progress on the village electrification project, and 26 electricity stations have been built in the various towns and villages of the sultanate, as have also the distribution systems in them. The Oman National Electricity Company has been formed to administer and operate a number of these stations.

Water: The production of water in the region of the capital and Salalah was about 1,744 million gallons in 1978, as compared with 359 million gallons in 1975.

Posts and telephones: The number of post offices and substations was 46 in 1978, as compared with 27 in 1975.

The eighth goal is to support domestic mercantile activity and to eliminate the difficulties of transportation and storage and the various obstacles that curtail the adequacy of the markets. Many accomplishments have been made in this field. The expansion of the road network has resulted in the elimination of difficulties in internal transportation, and the enlargement of the harbors and air fields has led to the elimination of obstacles in the way of the movement of foreign trade. The gross imports registered increased from 264 million riyals in 1975 to 327 million riyals in 1978, whereas the exports other than petroleum increased during the same period from 1.1 million to 3.3 million riyals.

The organization of the banking system in the sultanate and the increase in the number of active banks also helped to support the domestic trading activity. The quantity of bank credit for internal mercantile operations amounted to 9.7 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 8.5 million riyals in 1975, and the credit for export operations amounted to 92.4 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 40.0 million riyals in 1975.

There were 3,161 companies and establishments registered in the sultanate of Oman and operating in mercantile activity from 1976 to 1978, and, according to the statements of the mercantile register, the capital of these companies amounts to 49.4 million riyals.

The seventh goal is to complete the requisites of a free national economy centered on the activity of the private sector, on the basis of a free competition rather than monopoly, by way of establishing appropriate tax incentives and exemptions, offering loans to production projects on reasonable conditions, and investing in the capital of vital companies in a reasonable proportion of the revenues which are available to the state. In this field, the following accomplishments have been made:

1. The gross developments of the private sector during the 3 years of the plan from 1976 to 1978 amounted to about 222 million riyals.
2. The investment of the government in the projects of the private sector amounted to about 16 million riyals during the same period.
3. The Development Bank of Oman began to pursue its activity in 1978, and is expected to become a principal support of the development of the private sector in Oman.
4. Moreover, the government is offering many incentives for domestic production, including tax and customs exemptions, if the case warrants them.

The ninth and last goal is to raise the competence of the administrative apparatus of the state. In this field, the following steps have been taken:

1. On 28 June 1975, sultanic decree no. 27/75 was issued pertaining to the issuance of the law for the organization of the administrative apparatus of the state. The law was then amended by sultanic edict no. 13/76, issued on 11 April 1976.
2. The introduction of a number of regulations which led to the development of the national financial administration regulations was done, and the financial supervision became more stable. Furthermore, a new system was followed for the stabilization and accounts, resulting in raising the efficiency of these apparatuses.
3. The procurements council was formed, and projects began to be put to public auction. This resulted in opening the field wider to competition and afforded the government the opportunity to get better offers.
4. The institute of public administration was created, which undertakes to organize training courses and classes for state officials on all levels, with the goal of raising the efficiency of administration in the various government apparatuses.

#### The Gross National Product

The gross national product, reckoned in current prices, amounted to about

892.8 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 724.2 million riyals in 1975, which was the preceding base year for the beginning of the execution of the development plan. That is to say, the gross national product increased by about 168.8 million riyals at the end of the third year, or at the rate of 23.3 percent.

The national product of the agricultural and fishing sector amounted to 27.1 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 20.2 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 6.9 million riyals at the end of the 3 years, or 34.2 percent.

The national product for the petroleum and minerals sector amounted to 498.4 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 486.6 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 11.6 million riyals, or 2.4 percent.

The national product of the industrial sector amounted to 11.2 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 2.1 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 9.1 million riyals, or 33.3 percent.

The national product for the building and housing sector amounted to 85.3 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 80.8 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 4.5 million riyals, or 20.5 percent.

The domestic product of the transportation and communications sector amounted to 33.2 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 23.5 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 9.7 riyals, or 41.3 percent.

The national product of the electricity and water sector amounted to 8 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 1.8 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 6.2 million riyals, or 344.4 percent.

The national product in the domestic trade sector amounted to 72.2 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 38.5 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 33.7 riyals, or 78.5 percent.

The national product in the banking sector amounted to 14.5 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 9.8 riyals in 1975, an increase of 4.7 million riyals, or 48 percent.

The national product in housing rentals amounted to 21.8 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 9.3 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 12.5 million riyals, or 134.4 percent.

The national product in services and other sectors amounted to 10.2 million riyals in 1978, as compared with 8.4 million riyals in 1975, an increase of 6.8 million riyals, or 81 percent.

Developments: The value of the development projects which the government carried out during the 3 years from 1976 to 1978 amounted to about 68.8

million riyals, and the developments of the private sector during the same period amounted to about 222.2 million riyals. That is to say, the total of the developments which were carried out by both the government and the private sector amounted to 913 million riyals.

The gross developments carried out during each of the 3 years represented a rise in the gross national product amounting to 31.5 percent in 1978, 35.3 percent in 1977, 38.8 percent in 1976, and 35.6 percent in 1975, a level which is considered satisfactory. This reflects an effort in economic development which is considered to be among the highest of the levels exerted in the developing countries.

The distribution of the government developments among the various sectors developed in such a manner that the goods sectors began to assume a more adequate share of these developments. This is a healthy phenomenon, which is in keeping with the economic development goals. Furthermore, the economic sector still claims the largest share of the total of the government developments, for the need still exists for the completion of the projects in it.

Finally, it will be observed that the private sector has begun to turn toward developments in industrial projects, and this is a good sign.

CSO: 4802

WESTERN SAHARA

POLISARIO'S ABDELAZIZ REVIEWS STRUGGLE AGAINST MOROCCO

LD071433 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 4 Dec 79 p 6 LD

[Interview with General Mohamed Abdelaziz, Polisario Front secretary general, by APS: "On the Eve of the OAU Ad Hoc Committee Meeting": "The Moroccan General Staff Is Run by Foreign Experts"--in the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (SDAR)--no date given]

[Text] SDAR--On the eve of the OAU ad hoc committee meeting on the West Sahara question in Monrovia (Liberia), Polisario Front Secretary General Mohamed Abdelaziz granted an interview to APS in which he explained the Polisario Front's victories, denounced U.S. aid to Hassan II's regime, launched an appeal to the Moroccan people to rise up against the injustice to which the Saharan people are subjected and condemned the monarch's disastrous policy.

[Question] The Saharan People's Liberation Army [SPLA] is sweeping away all the monarchist garrisons in its path. To what can the resounding victories at Tan-Tan, Lebouirate and Mahbes be attributed?

[Answer] The SPLA has indeed liberated the whole of Saguiet al Hamra and is now operating in the Moroccan anti-Atlas mountains. To understand the major victories won by the SPLA you just have to consider the vast quantities of weapons and equipment captured from the Moroccan occupiers after each battle. For example on 17 January we captured 63 trucks loaded with weapons and munitions from the enemy at Limseyed. We did likewise at Lengwab where we captured 167 trucks and other vehicles. We immediately use all these vehicles, heavy weapons and munitions against the monarchist colonial forces. Consequently it is only natural that the volume of SPLA actions is becoming impressive and the results much better than before.

[Question] Therefore the SPLA owes its victories to the equipment it uses?

[Answer] Only in part, since the weapons do not explain everything. Account must also be taken of the low morale of the monarchist soldier, worn by defeat, isolation and the violence of war. These soldiers do not put up any resistance against our units when they attack.

The seizure of major Moroccan bases invaded by our fighters has had a profound effect on the Moroccan soldier's morale. Furthermore he no longer has to face rifle fire but the same weapons that he uses, which we have captured from his compatriots. Another factor which deserves consideration is the fact that the Saharan fighters know they are fighting for a just cause--to liberate their country and save their people from colonialism and genocide. The monarchist soldier on the other hand has had confirmation that he is waging a war which is bound to be lost and that his death will not benefit his country or his family. That inevitably produces his behavior and his refusal to fight.

[Question] Could the new weapons which President Carter's administration has promised the Rabat monarchist regime change the course of the war?

[Answer] The United States has never stopped supplying weapons to Hassan II's regime. Ever since our revolution was launched, we have been capturing American weapons in all the enemy garrisons we invade. However, what concerns us is the U.S. political decision to support a totally isolated regime--a monarchy condemned by all international bodies, by the United Nations, the OAU and the nonaligned movement.

[Question] Morocco frequently speaks of the internationalization of the Saharan problem. Is this a real possibility?

[Answer] The possibility of the West Sahara question being internationalized is raised only by the Moroccan press. The Saharan people have enough weapons and determination to liberate their country themselves. They have no need of military support in the field and will never ask for such support. On the other hand you can see how Morocco, without initially admitting it, internationalized the decolonization of the West Sahara by accepting military aid from Spain and then from France and the United States. So who is internationalizing the problem if not Morocco?

The United States and other countries are not content to supply tons of impressive weapons to the monarchist regime. They are supplying radar, guns, vehicles and aircraft, which we capture or destroy every day--not to mention the military technical aid provided in the field. Superior officers from several foreign countries frequently inspect al Ayoun and Semara. The Moroccan general staff itself is run by foreign experts. For 2 months now there have been signs of the systematic replacement of Moroccan cadres by foreign cadres in Morocco. This is probably being done to "save" what can still be saved of their sick ally.

[Question] In what framework of international relations can the ties between Morocco and the countries providing it with military aid in the West Sahara war be placed?

[Answer] The ties are clear. They are the ties which link world imperialism with Israel's interests. Hassan II knew of the link between Begin and

and al-Sadat as early as 1974; hence the aid and support given to Morocco by both Israel and al-Sadat's Egypt. These two countries themselves represent U.S. interests and since the consequences can be seen in the field, the circle is complete. Hassan II would like nothing better than to see the three countries take complete control of Morocco. In any case their technicians are already doing so.

[Question] The Saharan people are preparing to start their 5th year of national liberation struggle. What is a word for the Saharan people [apparent line drop in original]?

[Answer] Our revolution is stronger than ever. We have human reserves to continue the struggle for a long time. The equipment which the Saharan fighters have is completely satisfactory. We have already liberated Saquiat al Hamra completely. Our rearguard units are dealing with Semara, Bou Craa and al Ayoun. The bulk of our forces are operating in Morocco itself and they will continue to push forward right into enemy territory until our people's rights are restored and until Morocco heeds the voice of reason dictated by all international organizations and our continent's organization in particular.

[LD071435] [Question] Before your departure for Monrovia do you have anything to say to the Moroccan people?

[Answer] We have constantly appealed to the political courage of the Moroccans, at least those who are still outside the monarchist prisons. We still hope that they will pull themselves together and oppose the disastrous policy of the "shah" of Morocco and struggle openly against injustice and against obscurantism and that they will heed the appeal for the freedom of peoples.

We still hope that they might take this opportunity to anticipate peace for they know that the Saharan people are determined in their mission to regain their independence. If the Moroccan people remain passive they will inevitably bear some of the responsibility for the disaster, chaos and world imperialism's control over Morocco.

CSO: 4400

WESTERN SAHARA

SAHARAN 'PRIME MINISTER' LAMINE GIVES INTERVIEW TO ALGIERS PAPER

LD300809 Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 12 Nov 79 p 5 LD

[Tayas Belghiche interview with Saharan Democratic Arab Republic Prime Minister Mohamed Lamine Ould Ahmed: "A POLISARIO Front Delegation Will Go To Monrovia"--date and place not specified]

[Text] EL MOUDJAHID: Mr Prime Minister, you have just left Mali where you met with President Moussa Traore, who, as everybody knows, is a member of the OAU ad hoc committee on the West Sahara. The committee is due to meet in Monrovia soon. Was your trip to Mali connected with that meeting? Will you go to the Liberian capital and what do you expect from the committees ?

Mohamed Lamine: Mali is a country friendly to the Saharan people and might itself become a victim of Morocco's territorial demands. Our relations with this fraternal country existed before the monarchist forces invaded our territory. Mali is a member of the ad hoc committee and we visited that country for two reasons. Our visit took place in the context of efforts, first, to strengthen relations between our two peoples and, second, to inform Mali officials of the situation in the West Sahara on the eve of the ad hoc committee meeting. That committee has a duty to uphold OAU decisions and insure that they are implemented. President Traore assured us that Mali will take action and enter discussions to help the Saharan people recover their usurped rights. That is the hope of the Saharan people as an African people.

I believe that the days in which the future of peoples was discussed in their absence are now over. That is why a POLISARIO front delegation will go to Monrovia to express the Saharan people's viewpoint. We think that unless the OAU acts more quickly to find a solution to the West Saharan problem it is likely to find that it has been bypassed, especially now that King Hassan II is trying to internationalize the problem, which will form a dangerous precedent for the African continent as has already been the case with regard to the invasion and division of our territory. The OAU has never been an accomplice of colonialism nor of expansionism and the subjugation of peoples. Otherwise [if the OAU does not act more quickly] we would witness a radical change in Africa's geopolitical map.



EL MOUDJAHID: According to OAU Chairman William Tolbert King Hassan II will go to the ad hoc committee meeting whereas he did not go to the Monrovia "summit" despite announcing his participation. How do you interpret this new maneuver by Rabat?

Mohamed Lamine: The King lied to 48 African heads of state when he announced his intention to take part in the last OAU "summit" in Monrovia. He has now promised to go to the Liberian capital to attend the ad hoc committee meeting just when his foreign minister is making statements reaffirming that Morocco will never abandon its expansionist policy thereby rejecting the OAU resolutions on the West Sahara. Almost all the African heads of state think differently from King Hassan II. The African heads of state have to choose between their line, which is that of justice, and the King's line, which is based on expansionism and aggression.

EL MOUDJAHID: King Hassan II has proposed a conference of countries bordering the Sahara. What do you think of that proposal?

Mohamed Lamine: First, Morocco does not border the Sahara. The countries which do (Algeria, Libya, Niger and Mali) have already held meetings in Ouargla, Algeria, and Niamey, Niger, and they are holding another meeting soon in Bamako--a meeting which the POLISARIO front has asked to attend for the simple reason that the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic is also a country bordering the Sahara. The Moroccan government's proposal is an attempt to find other ways of gaining support for the annexation of our country. The Moroccan government has always tried to legitimize its occupation of the West Sahara but those attempts have always been rejected by the United Nations, the OAU and the nonaligned countries. The Mauritanian-Saharan peace agreement totally destroyed the monarchist claims. That is why the King is now trying to gain support for his claims by pernicious maneuvers.

EL MOUDJAHID: Were you not surprised by Spain's abstention during the vote on the West Sahara resolution at the UN political commission meeting? And were you surprised by Saudi Arabia's negative vote?

Mohamed Lamine: The Madrid authorities have a historical responsibility to defend the right to existence and freedom of a people against whom Spain committed an unforgiveable crime. Its abstention is an unfriendly gesture. We hope that the Spanish government will be capable of effacing Spain's betrayal of the Saharan people--a betrayal written in history. The Union of the Democratic Center, which is the party in power [in Spain], officially recognizes the POLISARIO front and the Saharan people's right to self-determination, it also recognizes that the West Saharan problem is a problem of incomplete decolonization. The Saharan people do not understand the flagrant contradiction of this abstention, which merely encourages Moroccan expansionism.

As for Saudi Arabia, which is a Muslim country housing Islam's holy places and whose fundamental role is to defend the life of Muslims, it is supplying

Morocco with money and weapons intended to exterminate a Muslim people. The Saharan people ask a simple question: Why did Saudi Arabian kings receive Saharan pilgrims as independent delegations from 1884 to 1975? Today that country refuses to accept Saharan pilgrims. Furthermore Saudi Arabia, while clearly alining with Morocco, pretends to be mediating in the conflict--a mediation which is distorted from the start since it disregards the Saharan people, the fundamental element in the problem. In addition we can only strongly regret that in this affair Saudi Arabia is siding with Al-Sadat and the Zionists.

[LD300811] EL MOUDJAHID: What is the present position on the Madrid Tripartite Agreement after the peace agreement between Mauritania and the POLISARIO Front?

Mohamed Lamine: For the Saharan people the Madrid agreement was null and void right from the start and was nullified in practice not only after the Mauritanian-Saharan Peace Agreement but also after Spain's recognition of the POLISARIO Front as the Saharan people's sole legitimate representative.

EL MOUDJAHID: Do you think that the supply of U.S. weapons to King Hassan II promised by the Carter administration could influence the course of the war?

Mohamed Lamine: The Carter administration's decision to strengthen the monarchist regime with weapons is based on subjective arguments. The military reinforcement of Morocco is an attempt to boost the Moroccan army's morale which is impossible since that army is waging a colonial war. What is strange is that the Carter administration says that in supplying arms it is trying to help Morocco to negotiate. However the vital question is negotiations between which parties? The King has responded by threatening to use one of "his rights" which he is constantly asserting. Therefore what is the U.S. position on the Saharan people's right to self-determination? The Americans themselves fought for many years to obtain that right. Does the Carter administration not see a contradiction between the American people's national ideals and the supply of arms to a regime which denies a people's right to exist.

Furthermore the Moroccan army does not lack arms but motivation, which it cannot have because it is involved in a colonial war. As always those weapons will certainly fall into the hands of the Saharan fighters.

EL MOUDJAHID: Morocco has given great publicity to the launching of a "mopping-up operation" in the West Sahara after which King Hassan II has stated that "calm will be restored in the Sahara in a few months." What is the real truth about this operation?

Mohamed Lamine: A regime which is incapable of insuring security in its own territory cannot be in a position to insure it outside its borders. Moreover when Morocco says that it is going to "mop up" the POLISARIO Front's bases in the West Sahara it is denying its own allegations that those bases are to be found in Algeria. In a few months time the Moroccan army will question its King about this "mopping up" operation.

EL MOUDJAHID: The Parisian weekly LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR has revealed that a delegation of Israeli military experts visited Morocco. Have you any information on this subject?

Mohamed Lamine: King Hassan II clearly maintains excellent relations with the Zionist leaders. We are not surprised that they are sending him military experts. It would be a historic meeting between Zionist, Egyptian and Moroccan experts.

CSO: 4400

WESTERN SAHARA

BRIEFS

ATTACK ON MOROCCAN BASE--Saharan Democratic Arab Republic (liberated territories), APS--The Moroccan military base of Zag, south of Uad Draa, was attacked by Saharan fighters on Friday, according to sources close to the Ministry of Defense of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic [SDAR] as quoted by the Saharan Information Ministry. The attack launched against the (Rouss al-Ouj) approach to Zaq resulted in substantial losses to the Moroccan troops of aggression which were forced to withdraw from several advance points such as (Rouss al-Ouj) and (M'zeiriga). The communique of the SDAR Information Ministry points out that 25 soldiers of the Royal Armed Forces were killed and 30 wounded, are two armored vehicles and two 106 cannon were destroyed. It says that Zaq is still under seige. [Text] [LD090007 Algiers APS in French 2030 GMT 8 Dec 79 LD]

VILLAGE ATTACK REPULSED--A communique from the Ministry of Information: A detachment of Algeria's mercenaries yesterday morning, 6 December 1979, attacked the village of Zaq from two directions in the east and southeast of Zaq. The village was bombarded by the mercenaries from 1845 until 1030 [times as heard] in the morning. Our Royalist Armed Forces confronted the attack with their known bravery and drove away the aggressors, destroying several enemy military jeeps. The enemy left 40 dead in the battlefield. The Royalist Armed Forces captured a quantity of arms and munitions. They lost 2 martyrs, and 11 soldiers were wounded. [Text] [LD072134 Rabat Domestic Service in Arabic 2000 GMT 7 Dec 79 LD]

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END